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In January 2020, several doctoral and master’s degree students from the University of Pennsylvania 
initiated a study of public policy and higher education through an advanced course in public policy. 
At the end of the semester, which concluded virtually due to the COVID-19 pandemic, these 
same students expanded and developed a full case of California higher education through 
November 2020. As their former professor, I was pleased to continue the work with them. We 
were guided by an overarching question: What public policies help us understand the performance 
of higher education in California? This adds to research on other states, including Illinois, Georgia, 
Maryland, Texas, Tennessee, and Washington. Some of this work is documented in The Attainment 
Agenda published in 2014 with coauthor Laura Perna. Other work was under the auspices of the 
Institute for Research on Higher Education at the University of Pennsylvania, which I directed 
from 2008 to 2020.
Of course, from the initiation of this work in January 2020 to its release in December 2020, the 
world changed. The pandemic from the novel coronavirus, the ensuing recession, and national 
unrest due to heightened injustice collided to change conversations about racial inequalities, 
individual opportunity, and economic recovery. These realities could not be ignored as we went 
about our work to understand how state policy influences higher education in California. The data 
and analyses we reviewed, the research that we drew on, and the individuals that we interviewed 
shaped our ideas and understanding not only of the national importance of higher education in 
California – simply due to its sheer size – but also the diverse, vibrant young and adult populations 
that the state should serve through higher education. California is experiencing this change on a 
scale that many other states are only beginning to understand. In this very real sense, California, 
with all its complexities, opportunities, and challenges, may be the harbinger of change for the 
larger national higher education landscape. 
As we dove deeper into our research and shared insights, we came to understand that the system 
of public higher education in California is performing just as elected officials expect. It was 
designed to educate a limited population because, at the time, most Californians did not require 
education and training beyond high school in order to find good jobs. In 1960, it would have been 
hard to imagine the growth and diversity that the state would face and the changes brought about 
by an information economy. The context of today’s population was likely unimaginable in 1960.  In 
our research we found that three “faultlines” helped us understand how policy influences 
performance in California. Educational disparities by race, income and place are well documented. 
They cross areas of K-12 preparation, college participation, and completion and affordability. 
Secondly the fragmentation of public policy at every level influences institutional expectations and 
performance. Finally, the volatility of public funding has consequences for long-term state and 
institutional planning but also wreaks havoc on family budgets.
FOREWORD
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What we found in California is a system of higher education that underperforms relative to its 
needs for a thriving future workforce and for a more equitable society. The system that Californians 
often refer to as “the best in the world” is at risk of increasing educational disparities among its 
peoples and their opportunities. We believe that the challenges that the state is trying to address 
are unlikely to be resolved within the governance and finance policies that have been the bedrock of 
higher education since the inception of the California Master Plan for Higher Education in 1960. 
While it is easy to point fingers, we understand the difficulty of reforming a mature system that has 
experienced international acclaim and success. We offer recommendations to contribute to the 
conversation about how California might undertake a process that would result in sustained public 
policy leadership for higher education for decades to come. Fundamentally, the challenge is one that 
the state must address, as it did in 1960. We are also painfully aware that the challenges of the global 
pandemic, the ravaging of California forests and homes by climate change, and the very serious 
problems of homelessness makes it difficult for the state to focus on higher education. But we are 
optimistic that higher education can be one of the state’s strategic assets in addressing these chal-
lenges while simultaneously serving as a tool to reduce disparity and increase individual opportunity 
for the nearly 40 million people who call the state their home.
The authors welcome the reactions of readers to this report.
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Taylor K. Odle
  INTRODUCTION
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
Like much of the nation, California faces a series of cascading crises, including an unprecedented 
pandemic, an impending economic recession, and large social movements for equity and justice 
while also battling the harsh effects of climate change. Postsecondary education can play a key 
role in addressing such problems by advancing research and policy, driving economic and work-
force development, and promoting social and democratic ideals. But California faces these 
cascading crises along with other pronounced challenges in its postsecondary sector, including 
the rapid diversification of its youth and adult populations, a projected decline in the number of 
high school graduates, and a pressing need to credential more workers for the modern 
economy (including those previously not served well by traditional forms of higher education). 
These contexts and harsh realities make this a pivotal time for higher education in California, 
where a challenge-ridden and constrained system must once again work to advance state goals. 
How the state and its leaders respond to these challenges will have lasting impacts on the 
sector and state at large for generations to come. To inform these actions, this case study 
documents the development and manifestation of a series of interrelated challenges facing 
California’s system of higher education, with a focus on how public policy can simultaneously be 
used to address them and to advance a shared public agenda for higher education.
Big problems are not new to California. In the 1950s, '60s, and '70s, the state faced what were 
then thought to be insurmountable challenges, including an expected “tidal wave” of students 
following World War II, the Civil Rights and Free Speech social movements on its campuses, and 
a disconnected system of universities, where students faced unclear paths from community 
colleges to four-year institutions. The state once again faces big problems, but big problems will 
bend to public policy—just as they have before. University of California President Clark Kerr 
and Governor Pat Brown used the California Master Plan for Higher Education of 1960 to 
overcome many of the challenges of the mid-twentieth century, including by developing a 
sensible division of labor among the state’s institutions, allowing a way for the systems to 
support democratic values and populist ideals (balancing access with excellence), and addressing 
systemic issues inherent in the sector’s operation. This Master Plan led California into the 
twenty-first century and shaped one of the most prestigious public systems of higher education 
in the world. Today, nearly all aspects of the state’s demography, workforce, and economy have 
changed dramatically. This means the solutions to today’s problems must be different than the 
solutions proposed more than 60 years ago.
The Master Plan of 1960 is still in effect today, but its utility has been greatly diminished. What 
remains is a structural division of labor between systems. What has eroded are critical features, 
including a guide on where to place campuses given demographic changes and a commitment to 
providing access to education for all who could benefit. Even with regular “updates” across four 
official Joint Committee reviews since the 1970s, few meaningful revisions have been made to 
the Master Plan, and it has become outdated and ill-suited to reflect California’s rapidly evolving 
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context in order to be a strategic asset to the state’s future prosperity and social well-being. 
The few features that have been updated include some duplication of academic programs, 
acknowledging the state’s growing diversity, and an affirmation of the state’s goals of workforce 
preparation, accountability, and efficiency, but even these changes fall short of the state’s need 
to coherently guide a complex system of higher education for the decades to come. Simply put, 
the Plan has outlived is public purpose. Even the title of the Master Plan makes clear that it was 
meant to guide the state only through 1975, not into the twenty-first century and beyond. As 
such, it was unable to anticipate the host of changes in the state since its adoption, including a 
more diverse populous requiring access to different levels and types of education; a sharp 
development of regionalism and its salience in economics, politics, and society; the escalated 
role of the workforce and the inextricable link between higher education and workforce 
development; the growing salience of attaining some education and training beyond high school 
for individual opportunity; and the increased complexity of the decision-making process given 
California’s public referenda (or “direct democracy”) process. 
 
While California may not necessarily need a new Master Plan, it does need a mechanism to 
support sustained public policy leadership for higher education that is reflective of the state’s 
new contexts and responsive to the needs of its populous. The state needs a process, 
mechanism, or entity to transcend gubernatorial and legislative terms, to leverage its 
postsecondary sector as a strategic asset for state economic and workforce goals, and to chart 
a path to a future for a very different California than the one of mid-1900s. Yet, in the absence 
of a steward to sustain and fuel a public agenda for California, the 60-year-old Master Plan 
continues to guide higher education policy in the state, and California’s continued operation 
under principles instilled by the 1960 Master Plan have come to produce negative effects on the 
sector and its performance. In fact, as detailed in this report, the Master Plan reinforces values 
today that, while once beneficial, jeopardize the state’s ability to meet its educational and labor-
market goals. For example, the strong division of labor and mission between sectors that once 
provided clean and clear roles for institutions has created lasting divides between sectors that 
have solidified the state’s siloed higher education system and led to policy misalignment, both of 
which ultimately harm the state’s ability to address fundamental issues of access and success. 
 
The lack of sustained higher education policy leadership or ongoing state policy stewardship to 
represent the public interest in higher education has deepened a series of “faultlines,” a 
collection of contextual and structural challenges that separate the state, its institutions, and its 
people. These faultlines are the result of the collision of changing contexts (demographic, 
economic, geographic, political, and social) and the lack of a mechanism for sustained public 
policy stewardship that would link far more Californians to educational opportunities beyond 
high school, establish a direct connection with the workforce and regional economic 
development opportunities, and diminish the gaps in disparities among groups that so prevalent 
in the state. 
 
In what follows, we present findings from a case study on California’s higher education sector 
that explores the relationships between public policy, state contexts, and higher education 
performance over the past two decades. Through the collection of primary and secondary data, 
including interviews with 16 policymakers, education policy leaders, and researchers inside and 
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outside of California, we document the development, manifestation, and implications of three 
primary faultlines. 
 
1. Persistent disparities by race, socioeconomic status, and geography that combine to 
sharply limit individual educational and economic opportunity for many within the state. 
Any measure of performance in higher education must address how higher education 
closes these disparities relative to the magnitude of the disparities in the population. 
 
2. Fragmentation, a term we use to describe the policy-related phenomena and 
structures that contribute to a lack of alignment and synchronicity in the statewide 
approach to postsecondary education. 
 
3. Volatility, or extreme variations and unpredictability in state and local funding for 
higher education, with impacts that extend into institutional resource allocations and 
family budgets. 
 
Capacity constraints—real and perceived limitations on state and sector political, fiscal, and 
physical resources—traverse each of these interconnected faultlines. Our research suggests 
that these faultlines have not only shaped the mediocrity in higher education performance that 
California has grown accustomed to in recent years (detailed in this report) but also make the 
state and its institutions especially susceptible to internal and external shocks, like COVID-19, 
climate change, homelessness, and economic downturns. While these faultlines have emerged 
and deepened over time, none have been systematically addressed through public policy. As we 
show, this lack of action has consequences. 
 
California possesses unparalleled prominence given its position as a “nation state,” its economic 
power, its growing diversity of people, and its history of social and public policy leadership. But 
these faultlines and a lack of sustained public stewardship for the higher education have left the 
state with suboptimal postsecondary success across many contexts. California has enjoyed 
strong performance on many traditional indicators thanks in part to the Master Plan, but this 
performance has seldom been to the level expected of a nation state. With notable deficiencies 
and a lack of excellence on standard measures of college preparation, access, attainment, and 
affordability detailed later in this report, the state finds itself with widening gaps in opportunity 
and ceding its top-ranked national position to other states. This suboptimal performance is 
insufficient for the state to meet growing economic and workforce demands—particularly given 
the fact that California has long lacked a link between higher education performance and 
workforce competitiveness. It is also inexcusable for the most diverse state in the nation to fail 
in providing the same public stewardship it once provided to students and families after WWII. 
A forward-thinking approach to public policy and a sustained mechanism for implementing these 
policies must work to serve the future populous and future economy. 
 
California’s rapid diversification means the state and its educational pipeline—from college 
preparation and high school graduation through postsecondary enrollment and completion—
must sharply expand access and success among groups traditionally underserved by higher 
education. Persistent disparities between those who enroll in higher education and the 
population as a whole translate into unequal levels of educational attainment across dimensions 
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of race, socioeconomic status, and place, which in turn directly impact individuals’ social 
mobility and economic prosperity. These disparities have, in part, led California to have one of 
the highest rates of income inequality in the nation. Without a public steward, California’s 
ability to address these issues has been limited. The state houses a fragmented system where 
gubernatorial and legislative leaders engage with higher education policy without systematically 
considering the changed context of the state. This discontinuity in leadership combines with the 
siloed structure of the three systems of higher education and weak or nonexistent 
accountability measures to hamstring the state’s ability to make concerted and coordinated 
progress toward reducing educational disparities and meeting workforce needs. This inability is 
further limited by exceedingly high volatility in state resources and education appropriations, 
which translate to unpredictable increases in tuition and fees—further widening disparities 
across individuals and institutional contexts. 
 
If California does not remedy its faultlines, the state’s higher education performance, and 
related state competitiveness, is at risk. COVID-19 and the oncoming recession may be the first 
test of the extent and severity of shocks to California’s faultlines. While our research began 
before the pandemic began, COVID-19 has undoubtedly deepened these faultlines by increasing 
volatility in state and family resources, widening disparities among the population, and 
contributing to misalignment between the needs of the state and its ability to meet these needs 
with sustained fiscal and political responses. COVID-19, the economic recession, and racial 
injustice present an opportunity for systematic action within California’s higher education 
system. With new leadership at the helm of each system (including a new University of 
California president, a new California State University chancellor, and the installment of the 
new California Community Colleges chancellor in 2016), this is undoubtedly a pivotal time for 
the state’s higher education system. In this opportune time, the state must “get to work” and 
consider whether some of its prevailing higher education policies or operations are suited for 
the state’s populous and economy. The challenges the state and its leaders face are, again, 
different than those faced by Clark Kerr, but they are not impossible to overcome. There is 
extreme difficulty in changing mature systems, but today’s leaders can learn from Kerr’s 
willingness to confront reality. With bold leadership, California must confront this new reality 
by abandoning the “Band-Aid” solutions that have been placed across these faultlines over the 
past few decades, and retrofitting its higher education infrastructure (financially, politically, and 
organizationally) to meet new needs and prepare for the ever-present threat of more shocks. 
 
California’s problems are fundamentally state issues. The state must engage a wide range of 
stakeholders that represent California and plan for the future stewardship of higher education. 
Statewide educational needs that go unaddressed must be at the top of the public agenda. As 
noted, this public policy leadership need not look like a new Master Plan per se, but systemic 
and sustained work on these faultlines must be a priority. The higher education sector alone 
cannot solve these, nor was it designed for that purpose. Recent efforts, including the 
Governor’s Council on Postsecondary Education and the California Postsecondary Education 
Recovery with Equity Taskforce, are important and positive steps that are likely to result in 
some improvement, but they are fundamentally short term in nature and unlikely to address the 
fundamentally fragmented and volatile funding policies that sustain them. 
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Our case study documents a need for sustained state policy leadership in higher education and 
sustained public stewardship of higher education. Public stewardship of higher education has 
taken many forms across the nation, but sustained leadership across gubernatorial and 
legislative terms is key. Year-over-year, session-by-session, and sector-by-sector agreements fall 
short in addressing the deep faultlines outlined in this report. While California enjoys and 
benefits from a rich diversity and strong bench of public policy advocacy and education research 
organizations, these organizations cannot change the law—and cannot substitute for sustained 
state policy leadership. What is needed is not the action of one governor or one legislature but 
rather a sustained change in the way higher education policy is carried out. 
 
In the following chapters, we present the findings from our case study with emphasis on 
documenting the development, manifestation, and implications of California’s faultlines. Each 
chapter features an analysis of primary and secondary data, including insights and quotes from 
internal state stakeholders and external policy and research leaders. In A Nation State, Maya 
Kaul and Melissa Bodnar provide important contextual information on the state to situate the 
case study, including information on the state’s population, geography, economy, workforce, 
political context, and higher education landscape. In Disparities: Compounding Faultlines in 
California’s Foundation, Melissa Bodnar documents how educational and economic opportunities 
in the state are sharply drawn along dimensions of race, socioeconomic status, and place. In 
Surveying Fragmentation in California’s Higher Education Policy Landscape, Elizabeth Dunens and 
Maya Kaul document how California’s political process, insufficient higher education policy 
leadership, and structural organization of the higher education sector have developed deep 
divides across the state and limited its ability to comprehensively respond to policy needs. In 
Uncertain and Volatile State Funding, Pooja R. Patel and Lindsay Adams Van Ostenbridge map the 
presence and growth of volatility in state and local financial support for higher education, 
including how public policies have exacerbated these trends and what implications they hold for 
institutional budgets and family finances. Joni Finney and I conclude the case study with Policy 
Implications & Recommendations, a reflection on these faultlines and how public policy may begin 
to address these issues and better meet the needs of the state’s populous. 
 
If California is to remedy its faultlines, it must reconsider how it approaches higher education 
policy leadership and prioritize reducing persistent gaps in educational attainment and economic 
opportunity along dimensions of race, socioeconomic status, and place. The state must leverage 
its higher education system as a strategic asset; a mechanism with the ability to improve 
individual opportunity and expand the state’s economic competitiveness. If we allow these 
faultlines to deepen, the link between higher education and a host of individual, social, and 
economic disparities will only become stronger; in other words, the strategic asset of higher 
education could come to reinforce the very disparities it hopes to eliminate. Without a 
mechanism to guard against this liability and to holistically ensure that California’s higher 
education sector works for the state and its people, the state’s politically and regionally 
fragmented structure, and growing financial constraints on public funds for postsecondary 
institutions all but ensure the state cannot meaningfully improve its higher education 
performance, the individual prosperity of its citizens, or the economic competitiveness of its 
workforce. To avoid such outcomes, we recommend that California (1) establish a substantive 
statewide policy agenda that includes a regional approach to higher education; (2) convene a 
diverse and representative blue ribbon commission to holistically consider the state’s long-term 
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higher education needs; and (3) evaluate how the state’s political, structural, fiscal, and 
operational approach to higher education could be better formed to meet the needs of its 
future populous and workforce. These steps will place California on a trajectory to recreate a 
system of higher education that meets the needs of contemporary life while also positioning it 
for success in the decades to come. 
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A NATION STATE: THE CONTEXT OF CALIFORNIA 
Maya Kaul & Melissa Bodnar, with contributions from Yulanda Essoka 
 
“When you have a state that’s larger than the populations of 21 plus states combined, it gives you a 
sense of the magnitude and scale of the nation’s largest state, the world’s fifth largest economy, the 
most diverse state, and the world’s most diverse democracy—over 27% of us foreign-born. […] It’s a 
point of pride and spirit that California has for decades seen itself in that light as our nation’s largest 
state, with all the power and potential it has—all the resource’s that reside within it: more scientists, 
more researchers, more Nobel laureates, more patents, more venture capital than any other place in 
the globe, the finest system of public higher education anywhere in the world.”  
 
- Governor Gavin Newsom, April 20201 
 
In the historic words of journalist Carey McWilliams, California is “the great exception.”2 The 
state is home to three of the nation’s largest cities—Los Angeles, San Diego, and San Jose—and 
its local industries (e.g., technology, entertainment, agriculture) make the state a central player 
in both national and globalized economies. As the nation’s first large minority-majority state,3 
California is distinctive not only in its size but also in its diversity. In this light, California has for 
many years seen itself as a model for the rest of the nation; however, the state faces persistent 
challenges in ensuring its citizens achieve what Governor Newsom has dubbed the “California 
                                                     
1 Office of the Governor of California, Twitter post, April 2020, 11:55 a.m., https://twitter.com/CAgovernor/status/1249773282309468165/.   
2 Carey McWilliams, The Great Exception (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999). 
3 Peter Schrag, California: America’s High-stakes Experiment (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2008), 2.  
 California is the most populous state in the United States. It has been aging and has 
become increasingly racially and ethnically diverse over the last three decades, becoming a 
majority-minority state in 2014. 
 Given the geographic scale and diversity of the state, a regional policy analysis is necessary 
to address workforce and education needs. 
 The GDP of California rivals that of small nations; however, the state’s economy has been 
seriously hit by the economic recession brought on by COVID-19, and income inequality 
persists across the state.  
 The expansion of the state’s workforce is threatened by higher education failing to keep 
pace with the economy’s rapidly changing needs. 
 California is a direct democracy state with a ballot initiative system.  
 The bedrock of California’s higher education system is the California Master Plan for 
Higher Education of 1960, a strategic vision for the state that continues to guide the 
higher education system today. 
 The vast majority of the state’s 2.4 million students seeking an associate’s degree or 
higher are enrolled in the public sector—in the University of California, the California 
State University, and the California Community Colleges systems. 
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dream.”4 Higher education has the potential to serve as a key strategic asset to the state in 
moving towards that dream. Understanding the particularities of the Californian context—
including its people, landscape, economy, politics, however, is necessary before one can grapple 
with the interplay between public policy and the state’s higher education system. In this chapter, 
we provide a brief overview of this context, with special attention to dynamics that have 
historically influenced the state’s higher education system. 
The People 
 
California has experienced substantial population growth over the years. In fact, “no other 
developed region of similar size anywhere in the world has sustained so much growth over 
such a long period” as California.5 From 1920 to 2010, California’s population grew by roughly 
936%, from approximately 3.6 million to 37.3 million.6 The most populous state in the United 
States, California’s population topped 39.5 million in 2019.7  
While the state’s population gains are projected to continue well into the future, the rate of 
that growth is slowing considerably. Between 2020 and 2060, the state’s population is projected 
to grow by roughly 5.2 million people, a total rate of growth of 12.9% over a forty-year span, or 
roughly 0.32% per year.8 Examining a comparable and earlier period of time, the state’s 
population grew by 17.3 million people from 1970 to 2010, a total growth rate of 87%, or 
2.18% growth per year.9 As the data suggest, population growth in California will continue, but 
at a significantly slower rate in the coming years. This slowed rate of growth will mirror 
population growth trends for the nation as a whole.10 Between 2017 and 2060, the United 
States’ population is expected to grow at a rate of roughly 0.66%, or 2.1 million people, per 
year.11 
Even as population growth slows, California is becoming more diverse. In 1990, California was a 
majority White (57.2%) state (Figure 1).12 Hispanics were the second largest racial/ethnic group 
at that time, comprising 25.8% of the state’s population, followed by Asian and Pacific Islanders 
(9.6%), African Americans (7.4%), and American Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts (0.8%).13 However, 
California became a majority-minority state in 2014,14 with no single race or ethnic group 
comprising the majority of its population. While this remains true today, Latinos have officially 
surpassed Whites as the largest racial/ethnic group in the state (Figure 1). According to the U.S. 
                                                     
4 Kathleen Ronayne, “Gov. Newsom Points to California Exceptionalism, Challenges,” AP NEWS, January 8, 2019, 
https://apnews.com/article/6083cff250d546469dd6007ac20a1f05. 
5 “Population,” Public Policy Institute of California, January 2016, 1. https://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_116HJ3R.pdf . 
6 Author calculation, “E-7, California Population Estimates, with Components of Change and Crude Rates, July 1, 1900-2019,” [Data set] State of 
California Department of Finance, 2019. 
7 “U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts: California,” Census Bureau QuickFacts, 2019, accessed January 2020, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/CA. 
8 Author calculation, “P-1. State Population Projections, Total Population by Race/Ethnicity: Hispanic Combined” [Data set], State of California 
Department of Finance, 2019. 
9 “E-7, California Population Estimates, with Components of Change and Crude Rates, July 1, 1900-2019,” [Data set] State of California 
Department of Finance, 2019. 
10 Jonathan Vespa, Lauren Medina, and David Armstrong, “Demographic Turning Points for the United States: Population Projections for 2020 
to 2060,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2018, https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2020/demo/p25-1144.pdf. 
11 Ibid.  
12 Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung, “Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals by Race, 1790 to 1990, and by Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 
1990, for the United States, Regions, Divisions, and States,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2002, 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/working-papers/2002/demo/POP-twps0056.pdf. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Mark Hugo Lopez and Jens Manuel Krogstad, “Will California Ever Become a Majority-Latino State? Maybe Not,” Pew Research Center 
FactTank, May 30, 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/06/04/will-california-ever-become-a-majority-latino-state-maybe-not/. 
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Census Bureau,15 approximately 39.4% of Californians are Hispanic or Latino, 36.5% are White, 
15.5% are Asian, 6.5% are African American, 1.6% are American Indian and Alaska Native, and 
0.5% are Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander. As these numbers suggest, Latinos, American 
Indians/Alaska Natives, and Asians have grown in their total share of California’s total 
population since 1990, while representation among Whites and African Americans in the state 
has fallen.16 
Figure 1. Racial/Ethnic Composition of California, 1990 and 2019 
 
 
       
 
Sources: Gibson & Jung, 200217; U.S. Census Bureau, 2019.18 
Long-range projections suggest that growth in racial and ethnic diversity in California will be 
sustained over the course of the next forty years, even as the rate of population growth slows. 
The White population in California is shrinking and will continue to do so through 2060.19 In 
contrast, the state will experience substantial growth among Asians and Hispanics, with 
marginal gains among African Americans and American Indians/Alaska Natives.20 Far from a 
monolithic group, California’s Asian population encompasses people with many distinctive 
regional and ethnic backgrounds.21 By 2060, it is estimated that Asians, comprised of roughly 20 
                                                     
15 “U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts: California,” Census Bureau QuickFacts, 2019, accessed July 2020, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/CA. 
16 Variation between “Hispanic” and “Latino” reflects differentiations in reporting between data sources. 
17 Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung, “Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals by Race, 1790 to 1990, and by Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 
1990, for the United States, Regions, Divisions, and States,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2002, 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/working-papers/2002/demo/POP-twps0056.pdf. 
18 “U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts: California,” Census Bureau QuickFacts, 2019, accessed July 2020, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/CA.  
19 “P-1. State Population Projections, Total Population by Race/Ethnicity: Hispanic Combined” [Data set], State of California Department of 
Finance, 2019. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Peter Schrag, California: America’s High-stakes Experiment (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2008). 
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different origin groups from across East and Southeast Asia and India,22 will account for 22% of 
California’s population.23 24 The Latino population, which became the state’s largest ethnic 
group in 2014, will continue to grow.25 It is estimated that Latinos will constitute nearly half, or 
45.6%, of California’s total population by 2060.26 In contrast, the White population in California 
will fall to just 23.5% in that same time.27  
 
California has always looked upon diversity within its borders as a strength, inviting people of all 
backgrounds to call California home. However, the driving forces of diversity within the state 
have evolved. While California is home to a quarter of the foreign-born population in the 
United States, the number of immigrants in the state has begun to level off.28 In the 1990s, 
California’s immigrant population grew by roughly 37%, or 2.4 million people;29 however, from 
2000 to 2010, growth among the state’s foreign-born population slowed to 15%, or just 1.3 
million new immigrants.30 Between 2010 and 2017, that rate of growth slowed even further, 
falling to just 6%—the first time in decades that California’s new immigrant population dropped 
below one million people.31 
Among its foreign-born population, California has also seen shifts in representation. While the 
majority of California’s immigrant population has historically been born in Latin America,32 Asia 
replaced Latin America as the largest source of new immigrants in the state in 2006.33 By 2015, 
“almost three times as many immigrants were arriving from Asia as from Latin America, and 
China had replaced Mexico as the leading country of origin.”34 This growth in the number of 
foreign-born Asians entering California has helped drive the state’s overall gains in Asian 
representation within its total population since 1990, as outlined above.35 36  
In recent decades, undocumented immigrants have also come to represent a significant, and 
important, subset of California’s total population—a new demographic group contributing to 
the state’s overall population growth and diversity. Roughly 23% of California’s immigrants are 
                                                     
22 Gustavo Lopez, Neil G. Ruiz, and Eileen Patten, “Key Facts about Asian Americans, a Diverse and Growing Population,” Pew Research Center 
FactTank, September 8, 2017, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/09/08/key-facts-about-asian-americans/.  
23 Author calculation, “P-1. State Population Projections, Total Population by Race/Ethnicity: Hispanic Combined”  [Data set], State of California 
Department of Finance, 2019. 
24 The authors of this report acknowledge that a diversity of individuals comprise California’s Asian population, and recognize that Asians are 
not a monolithic group. Reporting limitations at the time of this report do not allow for a comprehensive analysis of the varied and diverse 
individuals that comprise the Asian population in the state. 
25 Hans Johnson, Eric McGhee, and Marisol Cuellar Mejia, “California’s Population,” Public Policy Institute of California (April 2020), 
https://www.ppic.org/publication/californias-population/. 
26 “P-1. State Population Projections, Total Population by Race/Ethnicity: Hispanic Combined” [Data set], State of California Department of 
Finance, 2019. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Hans Johnson and Sergio Sanchez, “Immigrants in California,” Public Policy Institute of California, May 2019, 
https://www.ppic.org/publication/immigrants-in-california. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 “Population,” Public Policy Institute of California, January 2018, https://www.ppic.org/wp-content/uploads/r-118hj2r.pdf.   
34 Ibid., 2. 
35 Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung, “Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals by Race, 1790 to 1990, and by Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 
1990, for the United States, Regions, Divisions, and States,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2002, 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/working-papers/2002/demo/POP-twps0056.pdf. 
36 “P-1. State Population Projections, Total Population by Race/Ethnicity: Hispanic Combined” [Data set], State of California Department of 
Finance, 2019. 
   
 
“FAULTLINES” SHAPING HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY AND OPPORTUNITY IN CALIFORNIA   13 
undocumented.37 As a whole, the largest proportion of the undocumented immigrant 
population in the United States—nearly a quarter—resides in California.38 39 In 2016, California 
was home to approximately 2.2 million undocumented immigrants,40 and they comprised nearly 
14.7% of the state’s total population.41 Among California’s undocumented immigrants, 69% are 
of Mexican origin,42 contributing to the already high growth rate of the Latino population in the 
state.43 
 
Demographically, California is also aging (see Figure 2 on following page). From 2010 to 2060, 
forecasts estimate that the largest population declines by age in California will be among those 
ages 0 to 19, with only small increases among 20–49-year-olds.44 In contrast, the most 
substantial population increases will occur among those aged 60 and older.45 More specifically, 
between 2010 and 2060, the number of Californians 0 to19 years of age will fall by 1,361,557.46 
In that same time, the number of Californians between age 60 and 100 will grow by 7,503,954.47 
While the traditional college-age population, those between 20 and 29 years of age, is expected 
to grow by 0.55% during that time, the pipeline of future traditional college going Californians 
(0–19-year-olds) will contract, falling an estimated 13.0%.48 In contrast, the proportion of 
Californians over the age of 60 will grow exponentially during that time, experiencing a 122.3% 
spike in representation.49 As the numbers suggest, the share of residents reaching retirement 
age in California is growing at a very fast pace, while the number of school-age youth is 
declining. These trends will have important ramifications for the state’s public policy priorities 
and postsecondary education moving forward. 
 
California is not compensating for its aging population with an increase in young residents. This 
is largely due to a sustained pattern of decline in the number of births in the state since the 
early-1990s.50 At that time, the fertility rate in California rose to 2.5 children per family, the 
highest fertility rate in the state since 1966.51 
                                                     
37 Hans Johnson and Sergio Sanchez, “Immigrants in California,” Public Policy Institute of California, May 2019, 
https://www.ppic.org/publication/immigrants-in-california. 
38 Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, “Overall Number of U.S. Unauthorized Immigrants Holds Steady Since 2009,” Pew Research Center, 
September 20, 2016, https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2016/09/20/overall-number-of-u-s-unauthorized-immigrants-holds-steady-since-
2009/.  
39 Joseph Hayes and Laura Hill, “Undocumented Immigrants in California,” Public Policy Institute of California, March 2017, 
https://www.ppic.org/publication/undocumented-immigrants-in-california/.  
40 “U.S. Unauthorized Immigrant Population Estimates by State, 2016,” Pew Research Center Hispanic Trends, February 5, 2019, 
https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/interactives/u-s-unauthorized-immigrants-by-state/. 
41 Author calculation, “Unauthorized Immigrant Population Trends for States, Birth Countries and Regions,” Pew Research Center, July 2019, 
https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/interactives/unauthorized-trends/; “P-1. State Population Projections, Total Population by Race/Ethnicity: 
Hispanic Combined”  [Data set], State of California Department of Finance, 2019. 
42 “U.S. Unauthorized Immigrant Population Estimates by State, 2016,” Pew Research Center Hispanic Trends, February 5, 2019, 
https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/interactives/u-s-unauthorized-immigrants-by-state/.  
43 Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung, “Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals by Race, 1790 to 1990, and by Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 
1990, for the United States, Regions, Divisions, and States,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2002, 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/working-papers/2002/demo/POP-twps0056.pdf; “P-1. State Population Projections, Total 
Population by Race/Ethnicity: Hispanic Combined”  [Data set], State of California Department of Finance, 2019. 
44 Author calculation, “P-1. State Population Projections, Total Population by Age” [Data set], State of California Department of Finance, 2019. 
45 Ibid., author calculation. 
46 Ibid., author calculation. 
47 Ibid., author calculation. 
48 Ibid., author calculation. 
49 Ibid., author calculation. 
50 “P-Births: Historical and Projected Fertility Rates and Births, 1990- 2040,” [Data set], State of California Department of Finance, 2019; Hans 
Johnson and Qian Li, “Birth Rates in California,” Public Policy Institute of California, November 2007, 
https://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/cacounts/CC_1107HJCC.pdf.  
51 Ibid. 
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Figure 2. Percentage Change in Population in California by Age, 2010-2060 
 
Source: State of California Department of Finance, Total Population by Age.52 
Despite these gains in the early 1990s, the number of births in the state has fallen year-over-
year, dropping to 531,285 in 2000 and to 509,979 in 2010.53 Long-range projections suggest that 
the total number of births in the state will continue to fall well into the future, dropping by 
13.1% between 2010 and 2040.54 According to these projections, the fertility rate in California 
will reach a 50-year low of 1.50 children per family in 2040.55 This stands in stark contrast to 
fertility rates nationally in the United States, which are projected to increase from 2020 to 
2030, and remain constant at 1.80 through 2040.56 
 
The Landscape  
 
“[The] reality is that California isn’t a state. It's a collection of regions. And, they vary...enormously. The 
Bay Area is so different from the Central Valley as far as population, education attainment, the 
economy... It’s really important to understand those differences in California and then say, okay, a 
problem in LA is really different than the problems in the Far North, in Sacramento, etc.” 
 
- Dennis Jones, President Emeritus  
National Center for Higher Education Management System57 
 
                                                     
52 Ibid. 
53 “P-Births: Historical and Projected Fertility Rates and Births, 1990- 2040,” [Data set], State of California Department of Finance, 2019. 
54 Ibid., author calculation. 
55 Ibid.  
56 “Population Dynamics: Total Fertility (Children per Woman)” [Data set], United Nations: Department of Economic & Social Affairs, 2019. 
57 Dennis Jones (President Emeritus of the National Center for Higher Education Management System) in discussion with authors, March 2020. 
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As the third largest state, geographically, in the United States,58 California spans 163,695 square 
miles59 and comprises 58 counties.60 Forty-seven of those counties are considered to be 
“mostly urban,” while eight are “mostly rural,” and three are “completely rural.”61￼ 
Approximately half of California’s population is concentrated in just 11 counties.62 Despite the 
abundance of “mostly urban” counties in the state, however, many urban areas are situated in 
close proximity to rural, less urban neighbors. In fact, many of California’s rural communities 
are clustered around urban areas.63 For example, rural clusters with less population density can 
be found outside of San Francisco, San Bernardino, Sacramento, Fresno, and Los Angeles.64  
This variation in the distribution of California’s vast population across urban and rural areas 
throughout the state underscores the need for a more granular approach when considering 
California as a whole. For the purposes of this study, we rely on California Competes’ 
breakdown of the state into twelve distinct regions (Table 1).65 
Aside from geographic variation across the state, a regional analysis of California is also 
warranted within the broader context of higher education: “Since proximity is an important 
factor in students’ college decisions, California’s higher education systems must coordinate and 
act regionally to improve student outcomes.”66 This is especially true considering that a 
statewide skills gap is expected in California, with forecasts projecting a shortfall of 1.1 million 
workers with bachelor’s degrees by 2030.67 As Dennis Jones argues, California must “establish a 
public agenda [for higher education] ... in ways that [are] regionally nuanced”.68 Work has 
already begun to address this concern, as can be seen in such initiatives as Fresno DRIVE,69 
Inland California Rising,70 and various intersegmental partnerships, including those in Long Beach 
and the Inland Empire.71 However, these regional efforts must be expanded to more broadly 
address the needs of California’s workforce and economy in the future.  
 
 
 
                                                     
58 “State Area Measurements and Internal Point Coordinates,” [Data Set], U.S. Census Bureau, August 9, 2018, 
https://www.census.gov/geographies/reference-files/2010/geo/state-area.html. 
59 Ibid. 
60 “Regions,” CA Census 2020, accessed September 27, 2020, https://census.ca.gov/regions/.  
61 “Rural America,” [Data Set], United States Census Bureau, 2010,  
https://mtgis-portal.geo.census.gov/arcgis/apps/MapSeries/index.html?appid=49cd4bc9c8eb444ab51218c1d5001ef6.   
62 “Statewide,” California Competes, accessed July 2020, https://californiacompetes.org/p2p/regions?region=statewide. 
63 “Rural America,” [Data Set], United States Census Bureau, 2010,  
https://mtgis-portal.geo.census.gov/arcgis/apps/MapSeries/index.html?appid=49cd4bc9c8eb444ab51218c1d5001ef6.   
64 “Urban & Rural, 2010 DEC Summary File,” [Data Set], U.S. Census Bureau, 2010. 
65 “California Postsecondary to Prosperity Dashboard,” California Competes, accessed October 2020, https://californiacompetes.org/p2p. 
66 Hans Johnson, Kevin Cook, and Marisol Cuellar Mejia, “Meeting California’s Need for College Graduates: A Regional Perspective,” Public 
Policy Institute of California, June 2017, 4, https://www.ppic.org/publication/meeting-californias-need-for-college-graduates-a-regional-perspective/.  
67 Ibid. 
68 Dennis Jones (President Emeritus of the National Center for Higher Education Management System) in discussion with authors, March 2020.  
69 “The Plan,” Fresno DRIVE Initiative, accessed November 13, 2020, https://www.fresnodrive.org/the-plan.  
70 Nadine Ono, “Regions Rise Together series kicks off in the Inland Empire,” California Forward, September 16, 2019, 
https://cafwd.org/reporting/entry/regions-rise-together-series-kicks-off-in-the-inland-empire.  
71 Rose Asera, Robert Gabriner, and David Hemphill, “Starting and Sustaining Educational Partnerships: Two Case Studies of Intersegmental 
Innovation in California,” College Futures Foundation, April 2017, https://collegefutures.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Starting-and-Sustaining-
Ed-Partnerships-2017.pdf. 
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Table 1.  
Regions   
(From North to South) 
Counties Population 
North–Far North Humboldt, Lake, Mendocino, Del 
Norte, Lassen, Modoc, Nevada, 
Plumas, Siskiyou, Sierra, Shasta 
702,906 
Upper Sacramento Valley Butte, Colusa, Glenn, Tehama, 
Trinity 
355,726 
Sacramento Tahoe El Dorado, Placer, Sacramento, 
Sutter, Yolo, Yuba 
2,498,369 
Bay Area Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, 
Napa, San Francisco, San Mateo, 
Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Solano, 
Sonoma 
8,034,323 
Central Sierra Alpine, Amador, Calaveras, Inyo, 
Mariposa, Mono, Tuolumne 
189,687 
San Joaquin Fresno, Kern, Kings, Madera, 
Merced, San Joaquin, Stanislaus, 
Tulare 
4,219,489 
Central Coast Monterey, San Benito, San Luis 
Obispo, Santa Barbara, Ventura 
2,081,587 
Inland Empire Riverside, San Bernardino 4,581,109 
Los Angeles Los Angeles 10,162,069 
Orange Orange 3,189,883 
San Diego San Diego 3,338,661 
Imperial Imperial 182,844 
Source: California Competes, “California Postsecondary to Prosperity Dashboard”72 
The Economy  
  
The GDP of California rivals that of nations. California is an incomparable state when examining 
economic metrics to determine fiscal vitality. In 2019, the state boasted a $3.2 trillion gross 
domestic product (GDP)—the estimated value of goods and services produced within the 
state—due to its powerful economic engine that generates 60% more revenue than Texas.73 
California has the largest GDP of any state, comprising 15% of the national economy. When 
compared to global nations, California’s economy ranks fifth in the world, trailing behind 
Germany and eclipsing India and the United Kingdom.74  
                                                     
72 “California Postsecondary to Prosperity Dashboard,” California Competes, accessed October 2020, https://californiacompetes.org/p2p. 
73 “Table 3. Current-Dollar Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by State and Region, 2019:Q1-2020:Q2,” U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, October 
2020, https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2020-10/qgdpstate1020_0.pdf. 
74 Ibid.; “World Economic Outlook Database,” International Monetary Fund, October 2020, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-
database/2020/October. 
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Although California has the largest GDP of any state, it also has one of the highest state levels 
of income inequality across the nation—a problem that is further exacerbated by high housing 
costs. California ranks sixth nationally in terms of income inequality, with families in the top 90th 
percentile earning 12.3 times more than those in the bottom 10th percentile statewide.75 This 
inequality ranges across the state by region and is most concentrated in the Bay Area,76 where 
housing costs are also the highest in the state. In San Francisco and Santa Clara, for example, 
median home values exceed $1 million—well above the national average of around $200,000. 
As such, housing prices are pushing many Californians into homelessness and others toward 
less expensive regions, away from the coasts.77 As the following chapter will continue to 
explore, identifying these disparities is key to understanding the parallel inequities in educational 
access and opportunity in the state. 
 
California’s diverse sectors of business and industry contribute to, and sustain, the state’s 
economic growth. California’s broad-based industrial sector does not foster reliance on the 
performance of one or a few industries. Hence, after the Great Recession California 
experienced an unprecedented 118 months of economic growth.78 Although California is 
known for its technology industries, the state offers wide-ranging job opportunities. Based on 
Employment Development Department data, California’s industries today are led by education 
and health services; professional and business services; and leisure and hospitality/food 
services.79 This represents a shift from almost 20 years ago, when the financial services sector 
led the state’s economy by a margin of almost two to one, and manufacturing was the second 
largest sector, followed by government.80 
 
California’s fast-growing economy is fueled by its skilled workforce; however, the expansion of the state’s 
workforce is threatened by higher education failing to keep pace with the economy’s rapidly changing 
needs. Although the Master Plan—the grounding document of the state’s higher education 
system—focused on developing an “educated citizenry,” it did not explicitly address workforce 
development.81 Yet, maintaining a skilled population that is responsive to the shifting workforce 
needs in the state is foundational to sustaining a healthy and productive economy. According to 
the College Futures Foundation: 
 
By 2030, California is projected to have a shortfall of nearly 1.8 million workers. About 
59 percent of that gap represents the need for workers with bachelor’s degrees, and 
                                                     
75 Sarah Bohn and Tess Thorman, “Income Inequality in California,” Public Policy Institute of California, January 2020, 
https://www.ppic.org/publication/income-inequality-in-california/. 
76 Hans Johnson, Julien Lafortune, and Marisol Cuellar Meija. “California’s housing challenges have widespread effects,” Public Policy Institute of 
California, January 2020, https://www.ppic.org/wp-content/uploads/californias-future-housing-january-2020.pdf. 
77 Ibid.  
78 Gavin Newsom, “State of the State Address,” Office of the Governor, February 19, 2020, https://www.gov.ca.gov/2020/02/19/governor-
newsom-delivers-state-of-the-state-address-on-homelessness/. 
79 “California Industries Payroll Jobs by Biggest Month-Over Change,” State of California Employment Development Department, October 16, 2020,  
https://edd.ca.gov/newsroom/unemployment-october-2020.htm. 
80 “Just the Facts: California’s Economy,” Public Policy Institute of California, October 2004, 
https://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/jtf/JTF_EconomyJTF.pdf. 
81 Master Plan Survey Team, “A Master Plan for Higher Education in California, 1960-1975,” California State Department of Education, 1960; “The 
Master Plan for Higher Education in California and State Workforce Needs,” Governor’s Office of Planning and Research, 2018, 
https://opr.ca.gov/docs/20181226-Master_Plan_Report.pdf. 
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another 9 percent is for workers with graduate degrees. Employees with an associate 
degree or some college education make up the remainder of the shortfall.82 
 
If the state is to sustain its economic productivity, this “perennial tension” between what the 
economy needs and what higher education offers must be resolved.83 Increased degree 
attainment is only one piece of the puzzle, however; the state also needs to work towards 
producing the types of degrees relevant to burgeoning workforce needs across the state. Given 
the significant regional diversity of the state, identifying which credentials are necessary to 
support the economy can be a regionally specific question. Recognizing this need, Governor 
Newsom established the Future of Work Commission in 2019 to bring together leaders from 
across sectors to develop a public agenda for the state, focused on "creat[ing] inclusive, long-
term economic growth and ensur[ing] workers and their families share in that success,”84 with 
attention to differing regional needs across the state.  
 
In the wake of COVID-19, California’s booming economy has been seriously impacted. Despite making 
the difficult decision to shut down the state in March in response to the pandemic, the 
anticipated economic benefits of such action have been disappointing. In June 2020, David 
Shulman, Senior Economist at UCLA Anderson School, forecasted that, after a 42% annual rate 
of decline in real GDP, the state will not return to pre-recession levels of output until early 
2023.85 Additionally, the state continues to experience high rates of unemployment as a result 
of the pandemic. California recorded an exceptionally high unemployment rate of 16.4% in May 
2020, outpacing the national average at that time of 13.3%.86 While the state’s unemployment 
rate lowered to 10.8% in October 2020, California is still grappling with the economic 
repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic, and will continue to do so for the foreseeable 
future.87 
 
However, the state’s rainy day (i.e., reserve) fund, strengthened by Governor Jerry Brown in 
2014 via a constitutional amendment with bipartisan support, provides some fiscal buffer in 
times of recession by prioritizing one-time investments that address affordability. The state 
annually sets aside 1.5% of the general fund, and half of the money is allocated as rainy day funds 
to provide a safety net during economic downturns.88 Funds are withdrawn only when the 
governor and legislature declare a fiscal emergency. Reserves in the 2019–2020 budget 
stabilization account totaled $19.2 billion, and Governor Newsom allocated $16.5 billion to the 
rainy day fund that year.89 Between March and October 2020, California withdrew $9.6 billion.90 
                                                     
82 “Making Room for Success: Addressing Capacity Shortfalls at California’s Universities,” College Futures Foundation, October 2019, 4, 
https://collegefutures.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Making-Room-for-Success_2019Oct.pdf. 
83 Jennifer Pacella (Deputy Legislative Analyst at the Legislative Accountability Office) in discussion with authors, March 2020.  
84 “Governor Gavin Newsom Announces Members of the Future of Work Commission,” California Office of the Governor, September 11, 2019, 
https://www.gov.ca.gov/2019/08/30/governor-gavin-newsom-announces-members-of-the-future-of-work-commission/. 
85 David Shulman, “The Post-COVID Economy,” UCLA Anderson Forecast, (June 2020): 13, 
https://www.anderson.ucla.edu/documents/areas/ctr/forecast/reports/uclaforecast_June2020_Shulman.pdf. 
86 “California Unemployment Improves to 14.9 Percent in June,” State of California Employment Development Department, July 17, 2020, 
https://edd.ca.gov/newsroom/unemployment-july-2020.htm. 
87 “Monthly Labor Force Data for Counties,” State of California Employment Development Department, November 2020, 
https://www.labormarketinfo.edd.ca.gov/file/lfmonth/countyur-400c.pdf.  
88 Chris Megerian, “Californians OK Proposition 2, on Rainy Day Fund,” Los Angeles Times, November 4, 2014, 
https://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-me-pc-california-rainy-day-fund-20141103-story.html.   
89 “Citing Decision to Save for a Rainy Day, Major Credit Agency Upgrades California’s Credit Rating,” California Office of Governor Gavin 
Newsom, August 16, 2019, https://www.gov.ca.gov/2019/08/16/citing-decisions-to-save-for-a-rainy-day-major-credit-agency-upgrades-californias-
credit-rating /. 
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As such, the economic future of California is mixed with promise and unpredictability. Shulman 
portends, “It will take all the king’s horses and all the king’s men to put the economy back 
together again.”91 
 
The Political Context 
 
A Direct Democracy State  
 
California’s political context is largely defined by its ballot initiative system. Since the initiative 
system was adopted in the state constitution in 1911, California voters have had the right to 
“propose statutes and amendments to the Constitution and to adopt or reject them.”92 
Heralded as “the modern world’s most ambitious experiment of direct democracy,”93 the 
California initiative process was originally introduced as a democratic check on the influence of 
big businesses and politicians.94 Since the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978, however, the ballot 
initiative system has evolved into a highly contentious “fourth branch of government.”95 
Reforming property tax policy for decades to come, Proposition 13 limits property taxes to 1% 
of the assessed value at time of purchase, restricts annual increases, and requires any state tax 
increases to be approved by a two-thirds majority of the state legislature.96 Property taxes 
previously served as a major source of funding for both the K–12 system and the California 
Community Colleges (CCCs).97 In response to these dynamics, voters passed Proposition 98 in 
1988, “which requires the state to dedicate a minimum of roughly 40% of its General Fund to 
K–14 education each year.”98  
 
The power of the ballot initiative system has largely gone unchecked—empowering California 
voters and interest groups to use the initiative system to gain statewide traction for their 
interests and to diversify the state’s political agenda. Unlike other U.S. states with initiative 
systems, California “is the only state that does not permit some form of legislative repeal or 
amendment of statutory initiatives, either directly after passage or after a specified number of 
years.”99 The only exception to this is for propositions that explicitly stipulate a process for 
amendment by the legislature. For example, in the 2020 election, Proposition 22 included 
drafted language that a 7/8th “supermajority” legislative vote has the power to amend the bill.100  
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Regional Divides Persist 
 
Although California has gained an international reputation for being one of the most liberal 
states in the nation, a closer look at both the history and regional differences of the state today 
tells a more nuanced story. Until the 1992 gubernatorial election, California was viewed as a 
moderately Republican state with conservative politics.101 In 1998, Gray Davis was elected the 
first Democratic governor in the state in nearly 20 years102—after a historic recall election in 
which Davis was portrayed as “a prisoner of liberal special interests with an undistinguished 
record” by his opponent.103 This shifting leadership was just the tip a deeper shift happening 
among California voters that is intricately rooted in the very demographic and economic shifts 
this chapter highlights: “the dramatic turnaround was a convergence of economic, demographic 
and cultural factors, along with years of denial by Republican leaders.”104 In particular, the out-
migration of defense workers, following the end of the Cold War, and the in-migration of a new 
wave of individuals from Latin America, rapidly changed the demographics of the state.105  
 
Today, the electorate continues to be defined by largely regional factors, which are themselves 
associated with demographic and economic factors. According to a 2020 Public Policy Institute 
of California (PPIC) analysis of California’s “political geography,” “the land area of the state is 
evenly balanced between [support for] the two [political] parties”—with the eastern, more 
rural half of the state more Republican leaning.106 These urban–rural partisan divides are largely 
subsumed by the growing concentration of the state’s population living in urban centers, such as 
the Bay Area and Los Angeles.107 Some political issues in the state are not strongly influenced by 
location, however: “at least a majority—but never more than two-thirds—in every place in the 
state believes taxes are too high.”108 Other issues, such as housing affordability, are strongly 
influenced by regional differences—with coastal regions much more likely to support policies in 
favor of affordable housing than inland regions.109 Together, these factors suggest that any public 
policy analysis of the state of California cannot assume the state’s monolithic liberal status but 
must instead recognize regional political differences and the evolving demographics of the state.   
 
The Higher Education Landscape   
 
California Master Plan: A Vision for Excellence and Access   
     
 As discussed in the Introduction, the bedrock of California’s higher education system is the 
California Master Plan for Higher Education of 1960 (henceforth, the “Master Plan”). Developed 
through a collaboration between the University of California (UC) and the State Department of 
Education, the Master Plan was initially envisioned as a 15-year plan for the state’s higher 
education system but continues to guide the system, now sixty years later.   
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The original impetus for the development of the Master Plan was the dueling dynamics of the 
growing crisis of higher education governance in the state and, in the historic words of then UC 
president Clark Kerr, the “tidal wave” of new students associated with the aging-up of the Baby 
Boomers and the passage of the GI Bill.110 From 1940 to 1960, individual higher education 
institutions were “practically ungoverned,” there was a growing fear of mission creep among 
the three segments of public higher education, and there was a burgeoning power imbalance 
amongst the segments due to the limited financial powers of the Community Colleges and the 
constitutional autonomy of the UC.111 Together, these dynamics left the underlying governance 
structures of the higher education system incapable of adapting to meet the needs of the 
anticipated boom in enrollment. As Patrick Callan, former president of the National Center for 
Public Policy and Higher Education and the former Executive Director of the now retired 
California Postsecondary Education Commission (CPEC), suggests, capacity issues were at the 
heart of this crisis:  
 
[In] ’59 there was a huge Baby Boom population. The kids of the GIs and all the people 
who moved to California after World War II [were] in the pipeline, and the question 
was: how much college and education California would provide, and how much that 
would be organized, and what kind of sectors, and which kinds of institutions would get 
which students?112 
 
Clark Kerr saw it as necessary to clearly define the missions of each segment of higher 
education, and to more broadly find a way to reconcile what had previously been seen as a 
conflict in the state’s education system between excellence and access.113 To achieve this 
balance, the Master Plan, as codified in law through the Donahoe Higher Education Act of 1960, 
made several key contributions to the design and function of the California public higher 
education system. As future chapters will explore, the logic of these contributions undergirds 
today’s system, although the system has not been able to fully deliver on the initial aims of the 
Master Plan. In the words of Dennis Jones, President Emeritus of the National Center for 
Higher Education Management System, the Master Plan “was much less a plan than it was a pact 
amongst the sectors that kept them from fighting over turf. It divided up the turf.” In particular, 
the Master Plan “divided the turf” in five ways:114  
 
1. Differentiation of Function & Admissions Pools: To more clearly differentiate both missions 
and functions of the three segments of California’s public education system—the University of 
California (UC), the California State Universities (CSUs), and the California Community 
Colleges (CCCs) —one of the most significant contributions of the Master Plan was to 
differentiate the functions and admissions pools of the segments.115 The Master Plan posited that 
the UCs would receive the top eighth of the applicant pool and would specialize in research 
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and the conferral of doctoral and professional degrees; the CSUs would admit the top third of 
the applicant pool and would focus on undergraduate through master's degrees, with a focus on 
teacher education; the CCCs would admit any student and would include 2-year degrees, 
remedial instruction, ESL instruction, adult education, and workforce training.116 In reflecting on 
the Master Plan in a 1993 interview, Clark Kerr shared that he saw this differentiation of 
functions to be the most essential function of the Master Plan.117 More recent reviews of the 
state’s higher education system show that segment eligibility pools have historically exceeded 
those originally set out in the Master Plan: CSU enrolls nearly 41% of the state (compared to 
the Master Plan’s aim of 33%), and the UC is at 13.9% (compared to the Master Plan’s aim of 
12.5%).118 
 
2. Community College Transfer: The establishment of a plan for community college transfer 
was critical for ensuring that the system had the capacity to deliver on the Master Plan’s 
promises of equity and access. The Master Plan called for the UC and CSU “to establish a lower 
division to upper division ratio of 40:60 in order to provide transfer opportunities into the 
upper division of Community College Students.”119 In other words, the Master Plan suggested 
that each CSU and UC campus reserve spaces in their upper division (e.g., junior and senior 
classes) to ensure that there is sufficient space for CCC juniors to transfer into upper division 
majors at a 4-year public institution. By articulating that eligible community college transfers 
receive priority in CSU and UC admissions, the Master Plan designed a safeguard for ensuring 
that students who went through the community colleges eventually had access to a receiving a 
degree from a 4-year institution. As a result of a 2015 budget process, the UC today has 
updated its transfer expectations to enroll “only two new in-state freshmen for every in-state 
transfer student.”120 
 
3. Affordability, Fees, and Cal Grant: In the words of the UC Office of the President, the Master 
Plan “reaffirmed California’s prior commitment to the principle of tuition-free education to 
residents of the state”— with the exception of auxiliary costs—and also included provisions for 
student aid (i.e., Cal Grant) “designed to ensure the needy and high performing students have 
the ability to choose a California institution of their choice.”121 These provisions were designed 
to ensure that all students in the state would not merely be admitted to California institutions 
of higher education but that they would also be able to afford to attend those institutions.  
 
4. Separate Governing Boards: Although the UC Board of Regents existed prior to the 
enactment of the Donahoe Education Act, the Act effectively shifted governance authority over 
the CSUs from the State Board of Education to a newly established CSU Board of Trustees. 
Shortly after, in 1967, a Board of Governors was appointed for the California Community 
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Colleges.122 These three boards continue to exist today as the primary leadership of California’s 
public postsecondary systems (Figure 4). Although the Master Plan stipulated that there should 
be separate governing boards among the segments, it left the UC Board of Regents with 
relatively more authority, as per the constitutional authority afforded to the UC. Additionally, 
each of the CCC campuses have a local governing board that influence many policies, whereas 
the Chancellor’s offices have greater authority within the UCs and CSUs.  
 
5. Higher Education Coordinating Agency: Central to the vision of the Master Plan was that 
there would a be a central organizing body—a “coordinating council” composed of 12 members 
with equal representation from the UCs, CSUs, CCCs, and independent colleges and 
universities.123 Since the initial proposal for a coordinating council, the state established the 
California Postsecondary Education Council (CPEC), whose duties extended to monitoring higher 
education performance, participating in the segmental budget processes, supporting statewide 
planning, and providing a forum for policy articulation.124 CPEC was effectively disbanded by 
Governor Brown’s veto in 2011,125 leaving the state to rely on voluntary “coordination” 
amongst segment leaders and private institutions. The state today lacks any independent policy 
body to assess the state’s educational needs and the use of state tools of governance, finance, 
regulation, and accountability to ensure public needs are addressed.126  Although the state does 
not have the sort of coordinating agency as originally envisioned in the Master Plan today, there 
have been efforts to create groups to address statewide higher education need—such as the 
Governor’s Postsecondary Council, which brings together representatives from across the 
segments, K–12, and the Association of Independent California Colleges and Universities to 
work on higher education issues.  
 
California’s Higher Education System Today  
 
The structure of California’s higher education system today is largely grounded in the initial 
blueprint of the Master Plan, which established a tripartite system of public higher education. 
Although California’s public higher education system today does not exactly mirror the system 
envisioned in the Master Plan, it remains centrally organized around the same underlying 
structures and principles at the heart of the Master Plan.127 In addition to the public higher 
education system, the state today is also home to 161 private nonprofit colleges and 143 for-
profit institutions (Figure 3). These private colleges and institutions were part of the original 
statewide vision of the Master Plan, which commended “the great contribution private colleges 
and universities have made and will continue to make to the state” and suggested that private 
higher education institutions have representation on the proposed statewide coordinating 
board.128 
The vast majority of the state’s 2.4 million students seeking at least an associate’s degree or 
higher are enrolled within the public sector. Although the focus of our report is on the state’s 
public system of higher education, California is also notable for its robust private sector of 
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higher education, and is home to many of the most highly regarded private higher education 
institutions both nationally and internationally.  
 
Figure 3. Higher Education Percentage Enrollment by Institution Type 
 
Source: IPEDS.129 
 
The University of California (UC) system educates 12% of undergraduate students in the state and 
is composed of 10 major campuses and three national research laboratories: Lawrence 
Berkeley National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory.130 This commitment to research is central to the mission of the UC, and it 
is the primary public segment in the state responsible for educating graduate students, in 
addition to undergraduate and professional students. The California State University (CSU) 
systems consists of 23 campuses and educates 16% of enrolled higher education students in the 
state. With the exception of a few doctoral degree offerings, the CSU’s primary function is to 
provide undergraduate education and graduate education though the master’s level.131 Finally, 
composed of 114 colleges and educating 52% of higher education students, the California 
Community College (CCC) system is the nation’s largest system of higher education.132 The CCC 
system is broadly committed to providing academic and vocational instruction to California 
residents, and also offers remedial instruction, English as a second language (ESL) instruction, 
noncredit offerings, and workforce training.133 In response to a growing population of 
                                                     
129 Fall 2018 enrollment data from the National Center for Education Statistics, https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/datacenter/InstitutionByName.aspx.   
130 “UC National Laboratories,” University of California Office of the President, accessed October 25, 2020, https://www.ucop.edu/laboratory-
management/. 
131 “Graduate: Choosing a Program,” The California State University, accessed October 25, 2020, 
https://www2.calstate.edu/attend/graduate/Pages/choosing-a-program.aspx. 
132 Hans Johnson and Marisol Cuellar Meija, “California’s Higher Education System,” Public Policy Institute of California, October 2019, 
https://www.ppic.org/wp-content/uploads/higher-education-in-california-californias-higher-education-system-october-2019.pdf. 
133 “California Community Colleges,” University of California Office of the President, accessed October 25, 2020, 
https://www.ucop.edu/acadinit/mastplan/cccmission.htm. 
12% 
16% 
52% 
6% 
14% 
● University of California 
● California State University 
● California Community Colleges 
● Private, for-profit 
● Private, nonprofit 
   
 
“FAULTLINES” SHAPING HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY AND OPPORTUNITY IN CALIFORNIA   25 
“stranded” and underemployed Californians, the CCC’s new institution, Calbright, was 
introduced in 2019 as the first online public higher education institution in the state.134 
 
Figure 4. Segment Governing Boards of California Higher Education System135 
 
 
As established by the Master Plan, each of the three segments of the state’s public higher 
education system are led by an organization board (Figure 4). Though each board varies slightly 
in its composition, both the UC Board of Regents and the CSU Board of Trustees include a 
number of ex officio members, such as the state governor and lieutenant governor. The state 
governor also plays a key role by appointing a majority of board members—or all of them, as in 
the case of the CCCs. The UC Board of Regents is notably the most autonomous of these 
three boards, as the state constitution affords it the UC system at large “full powers of 
organization and governance” with minimal legislative control.136 The CCC is unique in that 
each campus—with the exception of Calbright—also has its own local board. In the case of 
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Calbright, the Board of Governors is in charge of decision-making for the virtual campus.137 
Each of the three public systems also have an academic senate, which operates in a shared 
governance structure with each segment board. The senates are focused on dealing with 
academic matters, and their responsibilities include establishing curriculum, setting grading 
policies, setting the conditions for the granting of degrees.138 
 
Straying from the initial vision of the Master Plan, today’s system has had no coordinating body 
for public higher education since the dissolution of the California Education Commission 
(CPEC) in 2011.139 When the CPEC was introduced in 1973, it had four primary purposes: (1) 
monitoring higher education performance, (2) participating in each segment’s budgetary 
processes, (3) developing a statewide education plan, and (4) providing “a forum for addressing 
issues such as transfers from colleges to four-year universities, common course numbering, and 
the A–G course requirements for university eligibility.”140 From its outset, however, CPEC had 
fundamental design issues: a lack of clear state goals for higher education; a lack of a clear 
mission in CPEC’s statutory charter; and a focus on establishing consensus amongst stakeholders 
rather than leadership.141 Under the current state leadership of Governor Newsom, there has 
been some initial movement towards establishing a Governor’s Advisory Board, although no 
formal coordinating board has been established. As will be explored in the later chapter of this 
report focused on fragmentation, a number of alternative groups and initiatives have been 
developed by the Governor’s office and the individual segments to help the state work toward 
a public agenda since the dissolution of CPEC.  
 
Conclusion  
 
The distinctiveness of California’s context has made the state at once a “model and antimodel 
for the nation and sometimes the world.”142 The context presented in this chapter serves as the 
foundation for understanding the dynamics presented in the following chapters—on the 
disparities in performance, fragmentation of the state’s political and higher education systems, 
and volatility of higher education finance. The dynamics highlighted in this chapter suggest that 
any policy analysis of California’s higher education system must consider the role of shifting 
demographics, regionalism, economy, and political context because these dynamics set the stage 
for public policy at large in the state. As the state today grapples with the fallout of COVID-19, 
climate change, an economic recession, and a national push for racial justice, higher education 
has the potential to serve as a strategic asset to the state—only if it attends to these contextual 
features of the state’s identity.  
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DISPARITIES: COMPOUNDING FAULTLINES IN CALIFORNIA'S 
FOUNDATION 
Melissa Bodnar 
 
The State of Opportunity 
 
 “If we are serious about closing the achievement gap and income gap, we must get serious about 
closing the opportunity gap. That begins with education.”  
 
- Governor Gavin Newsom, 2018143 
 
A nation founded upon the belief that anyone can achieve success through hard work and 
determination, the United States has long embraced the idea of the American Dream.144 For 
many, “America is known as ‘the land of opportunity’. But whether it deserves this reputation 
has received too little attention.”145  
 
Perna and Finney146 argue that the responsibility for ensuring opportunity, particularly as it 
relates to postsecondary education, largely resides with the states. Because “state policy is 
highly consequential to the performance of colleges and universities in meeting societal needs 
for individual opportunity and national and state prosperity,” a systematic assessment of state-
specific factors influencing postsecondary education is essential for understanding higher 
education performance and ensuring access, opportunity, and success for a state’s residents.147 
To that end, an examination of California would be incomplete without a consideration of 
educational opportunities and the performance of higher education for those who call it home. 
What factors advance or hinder an individual’s likelihood of being able to thrive? What role 
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https://www.brookings.edu/articles/still-the-land-of-opportunity/.  
146 Laura W. Perna and Joni E. Finney, The Attainment Agenda: State Policy Leadership in Higher Education, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2014).  
147 Ibid., viii. 
 Even though California’s overall educational attainment has increased, the state is 
plagued by persistent and prevalent disparities in attainment by race, socioeconomic 
status, and place. 
 Such disparities in educational attainment reflect disparities in postsecondary 
performance, including preparation, access, and completion, by race, socioeconomic 
status, place. Existing postsecondary access and attainment rates do not reflect the 
growing diversity of California’s population. 
 These disparities yield inequities in the state’s workforce and economy, directly 
impacting individual prosperity and social mobility on the basis of one’s lived 
experience. 
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does education—in particular, higher education—play in promoting individual prosperity and 
well-being for Californians of all backgrounds?  
 
In this chapter, I examine which Californians flourish, which struggle, and why. I first document 
how educational attainment is unequally distributed across the state’s population by dimensions 
of race, socioeconomic status, and place. I then show how these disparities are linked to gaps in 
indicators of state postsecondary performance, including: K-12 Preparation; Postsecondary 
Access; and College Progression & Completion. Next, I show how these disparities 
subsequently persist into the workforce, driving disparity in individuals’ employment and 
economic prosperity. I conclude by showing the pressing implications of these disparities: Given 
the state’s rapidly diversifying population and persistent disparities in educational opportunity 
and related economic prosperity, California will face an uphill battle in realizing its equal 
opportunity ideals if it does not first systematically address these gaps. 
 
Educational Attainment  
 
California is not prepared for its future: the state is simultaneously becoming more diverse;148 
aging;149 and facing a statewide gap in workforce skills, with forecasts projecting a shortfall of 1.1 
million workers with bachelor’s degrees to meet the needs of the economy by 2030.150 When 
considering those Californians age 25 to 64 with short-term credentials in addition to an 
associate degree or higher, the state’s educational attainment rate is roughly 51.1%.151 By this 
measure, California ranks 26th in the nation,152 falling just below the national average of 51.3%.153 
This reality is insufficient to sustain the needs of the state’s economy.154 Yet, even if the state 
were able to greatly expand educational attainment, it must simultaneously reduce persistent 
gaps by race, socioeconomic status, and place.  
 
Even though California’s overall educational attainment increased by 12.5 percentage points 
from 2008 to 2018 (38.6% to 51.1%), the state is plagued by prevalent disparities in attainment 
by race. Asian and Pacific Islanders have the highest attainment levels (63.9%) in the state, 
followed by Whites (54.8%), African Americans (36.4%), American Indians (25.2%), and 
Hispanics (19.9%).155 Given the fact that Hispanic individuals represent the largest ethnic group 
in California,156 and are projected to comprise a growing portion of the state’s population well 
into the future,157 their low attainment rates illustrate a lack of equality in postsecondary access 
and success in the state, which translates to unequal economic prosperity and social mobility. 
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Increasing attainment in California will depend on the ability of the state and its system of 
higher education to enroll and graduate a larger share of its diverse populous, including those 
traditionally underserved by higher education. The state’s economic and workforce 
competitiveness depend upon this. 
 
In addition to gaps in educational attainment along students’ race, significant disparities by 
socioeconomic status also exist. Nationally, students from families in the highest-income 
quartile are 3.9 times more likely to graduate with a bachelor’s degree by age 24 than those in 
the lowest-income quartile (62% compared to 16%).158 This gap has persisted over time, 
declining only slightly since 1970, when the highest-income students were 6.6 times more likely 
than the lowest-income students to graduate with a bachelor’s degree by age 24 (40% 
compared to 6%).159 Additionally, students from the top two income quartiles accounted for 
73% of all bachelor’s degrees awarded in 2018.160 In comparison, students from the lowest two 
income quartiles accounted for only 27% of degrees awarded.161 Large gaps in educational 
attainment also emerge when considering net worth. Nearly 54% of students from families in 
the highest net worth quintile attain a postsecondary credential, compared with only 9.1% of 
those from families in the lowest net worth quintile.162 These disparities persist when 
considering outcomes for students who are eligible for the federal need-based Pell Grant.163 In 
2017-2018, the federal government provided Pell Grants to 7 million students from low-income 
families.164 Despite the grant’s success in providing low-income students with needed financial 
support to access postsecondary education, there is a 15.5 percentage point gap between the 
8-year completion rates for first-time, full-time Pell-eligible (39%) and non-Pell eligible students 
(54.4%).165 For those low-income students who attend college, access is not a proxy for 
success. If California is to realize statewide increases in educational attainment, it must address 
gaps in opportunity and success for students from low-income families. The door to higher 
education for socioeconomically disadvantaged residents must not only be opened wider, but 
the state must also ensure these students receive support for their progress towards a degree. 
 
Disparities in educational attainment in California also emerge when considering place. Among 
California’s 12 regions,166 educational attainment, defined here as those with an associate or 
bachelor’s degree or higher, is highest in the Bay Area (59%), Orange (49%), and San Diego 
(48%) regions.167 In contrast, degree attainment is lowest in the Imperial (23%), San Joaquin 
(25%), Central Sierra (30%), and Inland Empire (30%) regions.168 The 36 percentage point 
difference in attainment between the state’s highest performing (Bay Area) and lowest 
                                                     
158 Author calculation, Margaret W. Cahalan, Laura W. Perna, Marisha Addison, Chelsea Murray, Pooja R. Patel, and Nathan Jian, “Indicators of 
Higher Education Equity in the United States: 2020 Historical Trend Report,” Pell Institute, 2020, http://pellinstitute.org/downloads/publications-
Indicators_of_Higher_Education_Equity_in_the_US_2020_Historical_Trend_Report.pdf.      
159 Ibid. 
160 Ibid. 
161 Ibid. 
162 Chichun Fang, “Growing Wealth Gaps in Education,” University of Michigan Survey Research Center, June 20, 2018, 
https://www.src.isr.umich.edu/blog/growing-wealth-gaps-in-education/.  
163 Victoria Yuen, “New Insights into Attainment for Low-Income Students,” Center for American Progress, February 21, 2019,  
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education-postsecondary/reports/2019/02/21/466229/new-insights-attainment-low-income-students/.  
164 Ibid. 
165 Ibid. 
166 “Statewide,” California Competes, accessed October 2020, https://californiacompetes.org/p2p/regions?region=statewide. 
167 Author calculation, “Postsecondary to Prosperity: Examining California's Opportunity Landscape,” California Competes, July 2020, 
https://californiacompetes.org/assets/general-files/CACompetes_P2P-Full-Report.pdf. 
168 Ibid., author calculation. 
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performing (Imperial) regions underscores the stark regional differences in educational 
attainment that exist within the state.169 In this regard, where you live in California is closely 
linked to postsecondary opportunity and individual likelihood for success. For those in the 
Imperial region, where 53% of residents have no college experience, the chance for 
postsecondary success looks significantly different than for those in the Bay Area, where 52% of 
residents have a bachelor’s degree and only 24% have no college.170 Improving educational 
attainment in California as a whole will, as the data suggest, require regionally based efforts to 
address access and success.  
 
California’s public colleges and universities play an important role in increasing educational 
attainment in the state, and reducing persistent gaps in opportunity. Educational attainment—
and subsequent social mobility and economic prosperity—is determined by several key facets of 
higher education performance, including preparation, access, and completion. A fundamental 
question remains: which Californians have the chance to engage in learning opportunities and, 
subsequently, enjoy the associated benefits that access yields on completion? Large disparities in 
higher education performance, from enrollment to completion, persist along the dimensions of 
race, socioeconomic status, and place, limiting students’ abilities to equally share in the lifelong 
outcomes associated with postsecondary education. 
 
Disparity & Higher Education Performance 
 
The term “disparity” is often used to describe social or economic conditions that are 
considered to be unfair, unequal, or dissimilar.171 In examining California, I consider disparity 
through three major lenses: race and ethnicity; socioeconomic status; and place. Over the 
course of a person’s lifetime, these factors influence individual chance for success, which I define 
as access to a combination of educational, workforce, and economic opportunities. Given the 
increasingly important role of postsecondary education in promoting the well-being of 
individuals and society, I examine these three lenses—and, by extension, the various disparities 
that they yield—through state performance indicators, including: : K-12 Preparation; 
Postsecondary Access; and College Progression & Completion. 
 
In considering disparities in the state of California, I examine current point-in-time data rather 
than historical trends, given our focus on the state’s immense population of increasingly diverse 
individuals. While various gains in higher education performance over the years are a sign of 
improvement, such progress is not sufficient given California’s population demographics and the 
changing needs of its people, economy, and workforce. The growth and diversification of 
California’s population has rapidly outpaced these improvements. My analysis reveals that 
opportunity for postsecondary education is unevenly distributed and individual chance for 
success is limited for many Californians by the intersection of race and ethnicity, socioeconomic 
status, and place. Each Californian’s unique, lived experience, as manifested in these areas, 
dictates whether they will thrive in the state.  
 
                                                     
169 Ibid., author calculation. 
170 Ibid. 
171 "Disparity," Merriam-Webster, accessed September 30, 2020, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/disparity. 
   
 
“FAULTLINES” SHAPING HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY AND OPPORTUNITY IN CALIFORNIA   31 
Race & Ethnicity172 
 
An important component of postsecondary access and success is preparation at the high school 
level. California’s A–G sequence, a set of college preparatory courses that are required for 
admission to the University of California (UC) and California State University (CSU), has 
become an indicator of college readiness among high schoolers in the state.173 Approximately 
50% of all California high school graduates complete A–G courses, but completion varies 
greatly by race and ethnicity (Figure 5).174 Asians and Whites complete this coursework at much 
higher rates than California high schoolers as a whole.175 In contrast, Latinx,176 Pacific Islander, 
Black, and Native American or Alaska Native high schoolers complete A–G coursework at 
significantly lower rates than their Asian and White peers.177 These differences alone increase 
disparities in who can attend a UC or CSU institution. 
 
Figure 5. A–G Course Completion Rate for Expected High School Graduates & 
12th-Grade Enrollment by Race/Ethnicity, 2018–2019 
 
 
 
Sources: California Competes, 2020178; California Department of Education, 2019.179 
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Beyond college readiness, there is similar variation in high school graduation rates for California’s 
youth. In 2018–2019, the four-year adjusted cohort graduation rate was highest for Asian high 
schoolers at approximately 94% and Whites at 88.4%.180 In contrast, American Indian or Alaska 
Native (74.8%) learners had the lowest graduation rates, followed by African American (76.8%), 
Hispanic or Latino (82.1%), and Pacific Islander (84.6%) students.181 These unequal rates in 
college preparation and high school graduation translate to unequal rates of enrollment in 
postsecondary education.  
 
California’s average college-going rate, or the percentage of California public high school 
graduates who enroll in postsecondary education within 12- to 16-months of graduation, is 
64.4%.182 Approximately 84% of Asian and 70% of White high school graduates immediately 
enroll in college, compared with only 60% of African American, 59% of Pacific Islander, 58% of 
Hispanic or Latino, and 50% of American Indian or Alaska Native students.183 While the data 
highlight racial disparities in the percentage of California’s high school learners who enroll in 
college, it is important to note that college-going rates overestimate college enrollment among 
high school graduates because they do not take into account those students who dropped out 
of high school. In fact, the high school cohort dropout rate in California is roughly 9%.184 Of 
those students who enter ninth grade and dropout prior to graduating, the majority are from 
historically underrepresented groups: 15.6% American Indian or Alaska Native; 14.2% Black or 
African American, and 10.2% Hispanic or Latino.185 In contrast, a much smaller proportion of 
high school dropouts are Asian (3%) or White (6.7%).186  
 
In 2018–2019, the number of students enrolled in postsecondary institutions in the United States 
reached 26.3 million; of this population, California enrolled approximately 3.8 million 
students.187 Despite the fact that Latinx students comprise roughly 50.8%188 of California’s high 
school graduates, they represent only 39% of total college enrollments in California.189 In 
contrast, Asians in the state comprise roughly 10.5%190 of high school graduates but represent 
nearly 14% of all college enrollments.191  
 
While the enrollment rates of underrepresented groups highlight overarching inequities in 
access to postsecondary education for high school graduates, enrollment patterns among these 
groups also reveal significant differences in enrollment patterns by institution type. As the Public 
                                                                                                                                                                           
179 Author calculation, “2018-19 Enrollment by Ethnicity,” California Department of Education, 2019, 
https://dq.cde.ca.gov/dataquest/dqcensus/EnrEthGrd.aspx?cds=00&agglevel=state&year=2018-19.  
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187 “Trend Generator,” National Center for Education Statistics, 2019, https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/TrendGenerator. 
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Policy Institute of California (PPIC) notes, “greater numbers of underrepresented students 
enroll at CSU and the community colleges than at UC.”192 More specifically, among Latinx 
students, an overwhelming 74% enroll at a California Community College, while only 4% enroll 
at a UC.193 Among Black Californians, 64% enroll at a CCC, while only 2% enroll at a UC.194 
Black Californians also disproportionately enroll at private for-profit institutions (19%) 
compared with their peers from other ethnic groups.195 Equally concerning is the fact that, of 
those students entering a California Community College in 2009–2010 who were on track to 
transfer, only 38% ever did.196 Recall, as outlined in The Nation State, nearly 40% of California’s 
total population is Hispanic.197 For underrepresented students in the state, particularly the 
nearly three-fourths of all Latinx learners who enroll disproportionately in the state’s two-year 
institutions,198 patterns in access and enrollment by institution type matter given variations in 
institutional outcomes. Inequities in access for a significant and growing subset of California’s 
population, in turn, can negatively impact students’ chance for completion and long-term 
prosperity and success.  
 
While educational attainment is an important measure of the proportion of individuals in 
California who have earned a degree, certificate, or credential beyond high school, it does not 
account for in-migration.199 As a result, educational attainment is not a true indicator of the 
number of postsecondary credentials the state of California produces. Thus, the performance of 
higher education, or how well California’s higher education systems are working for the state’s 
residents, is better measured by examining college graduation rates, or the percentage of 
students who began college at a California institution that ultimately attained a credential. 
California’s graduation rates within three years at two-year institutions and within six years at 
four-year institutions in California have fluctuated over time. Between 2005 and 2019, 
graduation rates within 150% of normal time increased by 3.3 percentage points at four-year 
nonprofit institutions in the state, while falling by 4.6 percentage points at two-year nonprofit 
institutions.200 Despite minimal gains and even slight declines in graduation rates over time, 
approximately 50% of Californians that began college in 2013 graduated with an associate or 
bachelor’s degree within three or six years, respectively, compared to 42% nationally.201 
Looking specifically at California’s public postsecondary sector, graduation rates within 150% of 
normal time vary greatly, but are highest at UCs (84%) and lowest at CSUs (59%) and CCCs 
(31%).202 
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Within racial and ethnic groups, graduation rates are highest at both two- and four-year 
institutions for Asians and Whites, and lowest for Black, Hispanic, and American Indian or 
Alaska Native learners (Figure 6).203 Within California’s public higher education systems, 
including the UCs, CSUs, and CCCs, graduation rates are also higher for Asians and Whites 
than for Hispanic, American Indian/Alaska Native, and African American students.204 Thus, even 
when historically underserved populations of learners are able to access higher education in the 
state, they are still disadvantaged in moving toward completion, graduating at lower rates than 
their Asian and White peers in all of the state’s public sectors. 
 
Figure 6. Graduation Rates within 150% of Normal Time (Bachelor’s in 6 years for 
cohort year 2013; Associate in 3 years for cohort year 2016) by Race & Ethnicity 
 
 
 
Source: National Center for Education Statistics, 2019.205 
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Socioeconomic Status 
 
Bohn and Thorman206 contend that “the gap between rich and poor is especially wide in 
California,” a reality that is difficult to reconcile with the sheer size and immensity of the state’s 
economy. Despite the fact that California’s economy is the largest of any state, and the fifth 
largest in the world,207 its wealth is unevenly distributed, with families at the top of the income 
distribution earning approximately 12.3 times more than the families at the bottom of the 
distribution.208 In 2019, approximately 11.8%, or roughly 4.6 million, Californians were living 
below poverty,209 and, in 2018, roughly 17.6%, or 6.8 million, lacked enough resources to meet 
basic needs.210 Further, more than a third (35.2%) of Californians at that time were considered 
poor or “near” poor.211 Given that poverty and education level are closely linked, access to 
opportunity and chance for success in California is inextricably tied to socioeconomic status.212  
At the K–12 level, the proportion of socioeconomically disadvantaged students in California has 
grown significantly over time. In 1990, 36% of students were approved for free or reduced-
price lunch; by 2019, that number nearly doubled to 63%.213 This increase in the proportion of 
schools serving largely economically disadvantaged learners has important implications for 
college readiness. In fact, A–G course completion rates are significantly higher at more 
economically advantaged high schools.214 At the student level, “socioeconomically disadvantaged 
students are half as likely to be prepared [for postsecondary education] as their more 
prosperous peers,”215 with only 39% of economically disadvantaged high schoolers completing 
A–G coursework.216 In addition to lagging behind their wealthier peers in overall A–G course 
completion, economically disadvantaged students also graduate from high school at lower rates 
than the total population. In 2015–2016, California’s overall high school graduation rate was 
84%, but lower income students graduated at a rate of 79%.217 
 
For those low-income students who do graduate high school, more than half (58%) enroll in 
postsecondary education after completing high school.218 However, college-going rates for 
students from the lowest-income families in the state fall short of those from high-income 
families. Roughly 67% of recent high school graduates with family incomes under $30,000 enroll 
in postsecondary education, compared with 88% of recent high school graduates with family 
incomes over $150,000.219 While postsecondary enrollment among low-income students is 
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relatively high overall, they predominantly enroll in CCCs.220 Of those socioeconomically 
disadvantaged students enrolled in the state’s public sector, more than half (69%) matriculate at 
CCCs, while only 10% enroll at UCs—a reality that is likely tied in part to this population’s low 
A–G course completion rates (Figure 7).221 In contrast, among students from families earning 
more than $75,000, only 6% enroll at a CCC, while 58% enroll at a UC or CSU, and 30% enroll 
at a private nonprofit.222 Thus, equitable access to opportunity, as afforded through the type of 
institution attended, is significantly skewed against socioeconomically disadvantaged students in 
California.  
 
Figure 7. Low-Income Student Enrollment by Institution Type, 2017 
 
 
 
Source: California Competes, 2020.223 
 
Unfortunately, for socioeconomically disadvantaged students, access to postsecondary 
education is not enough. Where a student enrolls has implications for their postsecondary 
outcomes. Less than half of all community college students transfer or obtain a degree or 
certificate within six years.224 In fact, “students who start at a community college are less likely 
to earn a bachelor’s degree than those who start at a four-year institution.”225 This puts low-
income students, 66% of whom enroll in the CCC system,226 at a distinct disadvantage—
particularly in terms of long-term economic prosperity. However, even when enrolled at four-
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year institutions in the state, socioeconomically disadvantaged learners still face barriers to 
completion (Figure 8).  
 
On average, low-income students graduate at lower rates at UC, private nonprofit, and CSU 
institutions than their more economically advantaged peers.227 Equity gaps in degree completion 
between student populations that are low-income and not low-income are largest (11 
percentage points) at CSU and private nonprofit schools (9 percentage points), and smallest at 
UC (6 percentage points).228 Considering that approximately 55% of CSU students are 
considered low-income, and that more socioeconomically disadvantaged Californians enroll at 
CSUs than UCs overall, this population’s lower graduation rates are particularly concerning.229   
 
Figure 8. Six-Year Graduation Rates at Four-Year Institutions by Student Type 
 
 
Source: Johnson, Cuellar Mejia, & Bohn, 2018.230 
 
Place 
 
In a state as large as California, where you live matters. Geographic location within the state 
not only influences the availability of job opportunities but also impacts a host of educational 
and economic outcomes, including: educational experience and preparation, the types of 
postsecondary institutions you can attend, whether or not you can access those opportunities, 
and your long-term economic prospects. Despite California’s vast size and geographic diversity, 
most public elementary and secondary schools in the state are concentrated in cities and 
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suburban areas.231 Approximately 7% of schools are located in towns, defined as territories 
inside an urban cluster that surround a denser, more urbanized area, and 11% are located in 
rural communities.232 This means that roughly 82% of K-12 schools are situated in California’s 
cities and suburbs, where they serve nearly 89% of the state’s students.233 Despite the 
concentration of many learners in cities and suburbs, more than half a million students, or 
roughly one in ten, live in rural areas.234 The distribution of schools across urban, suburban, and 
rural communities necessitates consideration of resource allocation and educational 
opportunity across California’s primary and secondary schools in these areas. According to 
Betts et al.,235 “counties with large suburban areas tend to have more resources than counties 
with heavy urban or rural populations”—a reality that precipitates location-based disparities in 
K–12 preparation.  
 
A lower share of rural students than urban students enroll in Advanced Placement (AP) classes 
for college credit; in 2017-2018, 16.3% of rural high school seniors completed AP coursework 
and took the AP exam, compared with 27.6% of urban high school seniors.236 Additionally, rural 
schools are much less likely than their urban peers to offer the full A–G course sequence.237 
When rural schools do offer the A–G curriculum, however, fewer rural students (28.1%) 
complete the college preparatory courses than their urban peers (41.3%).238 While graduation 
rates are comparable between urban and rural high schoolers, rural students are significantly 
less prepared for college than their urban peers when they earn their diplomas (Figure 9, see 
following page).239  
 
Beyond college preparation at the high school level, access to postsecondary education is also 
closely tied to location. In fact, “geography plays a key role in the options and opportunities 
available to a student.”240 Roughly 60% of first-year students enroll within 50 miles of home.241 
On a more granular level, the median distance from students’ homes to the colleges where they 
matriculate is roughly 8 miles for those attending public two-year colleges, 18 miles for those 
attending public four-year colleges, and 46 miles for those attending private nonprofit 
institutions.242 This trend is particularly concerning when considering access through a 
geographic lens; “the farther students live from any particular college, the less likely they are to 
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enroll.”243 If students make enrollment decisions based on where they live, location must be 
part of larger conversations about postsecondary access. Yet, in California, the majority of the 
state’s public postsecondary institutions are concentrated in clusters along the coast and 
throughout the central part of the state—typically in more urban communities.244,245 As one 
moves inland from the coast into the more disparate, rural parts of the state, the number of 
public postsecondary institutions declines, and UC and CSU institutions in particular become 
scarcer and more spread out—especially in counties near the state’s northern and eastern 
borders.246  
Figure 9. Measures of College Readiness, Urban and Rural Schools 
 
 
Source: Jones, 2019.247 
To this end, two of California’s twelve regions—Central Sierra and Imperial248—are considered 
to be education deserts, or areas in which there are zero colleges or universities nearby, or in 
which a single community college is the only public, broad-access institution in close 
proximity.249 Both regions, which are largely rural in nature, feature just one California 
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Community College each within their limits.250 Conversely, the Bay Area and Los Angeles 
regions are home to roughly 41% of all CCCs, 43% of all CSUs, and 33% of all UCs in the 
state.251 Given the high proportion of California’s total population concentrated in these 
regions, it is reasonable to assume that a significant share of the state’s public institutions would 
be located here, but such a reality deprives more disparate, rural communities of reasonable 
access to these institutions. If you are situated in the state’s denser, more urban areas, 
postsecondary options are more abundant.252 For those living in the state’s rural communities, 
however, opportunity quickly dwindles as college campuses become more spread out across 
greater distances and as the number of public four-year institutions decreases.253 Such a reality 
limits access to opportunity on the basis of the types of institutions Californians can reasonably 
engage with in relation to their geographic location. For these reasons, rural Californians tend 
to have fewer postsecondary education options.254 
 
Given Californians’ unequal geographic access to college, when they do pursue postsecondary 
education, it is no surprise that enrollment patterns vary regionally. Among high school graduates 
from the state’s less populous rural and desert regions255 (Central Sierra, Imperial, North–Far 
North, and Upper Sacramento Valley256), roughly 43% do not enroll in postsecondary 
education.257 Of those who do enroll in college, the majority (42%) enroll at a CCC institution, 
with only 3% attending a UC and 7% attending a CSU.258 In contrast, enrollment rates at UCs 
(7%) and CSUs (12%) are highest among recent high school graduates in the state’s more 
populous urban regions—nearly double that of rural grads.259 As the data suggest, rural high 
school graduates are less likely to enroll in postsecondary education than their urban peers, 
and, when they do enroll, they matriculate at slightly higher rates at CCCs and at significantly 
lower rates at CSUs and UCs.  
 
Additionally, for students who enroll within the boundaries of the regions that they call home, 
inequality between urban and rural areas is further amplified based on the availability of 
postsecondary options within regional bounds. For example, 100% of residents enrolling at 
institutions within the Imperial and Central Sierra regions matriculate at a California 
Community College.260 While enrollment in most regions of California is highest at CCCs, the 
spread of enrollment is more varied in areas where there are more public four-year options. 
Approximately 69% of local residents attending college in the Bay Area region enroll in CCCs, 
while an additional 13% enroll in CSUs, and 8% in UCs.261 In the San Diego region, 52% of local 
residents attend CCCs, and 11% attend CSUs.262 In rural areas where CSUs are accessible 
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within regional bounds, students matriculate at these institutions at greater rates than many of 
their urban peers. Roughly 55% of local residents attending college in the Upper Sacramento 
Valley region enroll at CSUs, outpacing enrollment at the region’s CCCs by 10 percentage 
points.263 Likewise, 80% of residents in the North–Far North region matriculate at local CCCs, 
with an additional 18% enrolling at CSUs, the second highest in-region CSU enrollment rate 
across California’s 12 regions.264 On average, local enrollment at CSUs situated in more 
populous regions of the state is approximately 13%, falling below the average rate of enrollment 
(18%) at CSUs in more rural regions.265 As the data suggest, when given the opportunity to 
enroll in a regional CSU, rural residents tend to matriculate at slightly higher rates.  
 
Beyond enrollment, regional disparities also emerge when considering postsecondary 
outcomes. Five-year bachelor’s degree graduation rates are highest in the Central Coast, 
Sacramento–Tahoe, Bay Area, Los Angeles, and Orange regions (Figure 10).266 In contrast, five-
year bachelor’s graduation rates are the lowest of all regions in the rural North–Far North.267 
Given that five of California’s 12 regions fall below the statewide average for bachelor’s 
completion, the state has much work to do to improve graduation rates across regions of all 
types; however, its urban centers do generally fare better than their more rural counterparts in 
the proportion of bachelor’s degrees produced within regional bounds. 
 
Figure 10. Five-Year Bachelor’s Degree Graduation Rates by Region, 2016–2017 
 
 
Source: California Competes, 2020.268 
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Employment, Economic Prosperity, and Social Mobility  
 
Disparities in educational performance—from college preparation and high school graduation 
to college enrollment and completion—have important implications for individuals’ workforce 
outcomes, driving disparity in employment and social mobility. Across the United States, 
“postsecondary education is increasingly seen as an important step for obtaining beneficial long-
term occupational and economic outcomes.”269 On average, those in the United States with a 
doctoral or professional degree enjoy median weekly earnings ($1,883) that are more than 
three times higher than those with less than a high school diploma ($592).270 While earnings 
increase in proportion to the level of education attained, unemployment rates decrease as the 
level of education increases. The unemployment rate in the United States is lowest for those 
with a doctoral (1.1%), professional degree (1.6%), master’s degree (2%), or bachelor’s degree 
(2.2%), compared with those with less than a high school diploma (5.4%).271 Quite simply, 
college graduates fare better than those without postsecondary education. Higher education 
performance is especially pertinent when considering this fact. As a result, unequal 
postsecondary performance in California, and gaps in overall educational attainment, yield 
significant disparities in economic prosperity and social mobility within the state by race, 
socioeconomic status, and place.  
 
In total, 64% of all Californians earn a living wage.272 However, the percentage of families 
earning a living wage varies greatly by race and ethnicity, with Black (51%), Latinx (46%), and 
Native American or Alaska Native Californians (45%) disproportionately struggling to do so.273 
This fact is also reflected in median income. The median income for Asian ($53,740) and White 
Californians ($56,000) is close to $30,000 more than the lowest earning groups (Native 
American or Alaska Native at $25,000; Latinx at $29,400).274 Alarmingly, wealth in California is 
even more unevenly distributed than income.275 In Los Angeles alone, median net worth for 
White families was $355,000 in 2014, while the median net worth for Black and Latinx families 
was just a fraction of that at $76,000 and $46,000, respectively.276 Additionally, 
underrepresented Californians are more likely to be affected by unemployment. In August 
2020, the unemployment rate in California climbed to 15.9% as a result of the economic 
downturn from the COVID-19 pandemic.277 Black and Hispanic residents in the state 
disproportionately contributed to this increase, recording unemployment levels over 18% 
compared with Whites (13.5%) and Asians (14.2%).278 
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Among educational groups, the poverty rate in California is lowest (4.5%) for those with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher.279 Additionally, median earnings for Californians 25 years and over 
with a bachelor’s degree are $31,584 higher than those with no education beyond high school, 
and $23,988 higher than those with some college or an associate degree.280 As the data suggest, 
socioeconomic status is directly impacted by higher education. Low-income students’ chance for 
greater lifetime earnings and upward economic mobility increases when they enroll and persist 
at four-year institutions—a reality that has not yet been fully realized in California, where low-
income students enroll at and graduate from four-year institutions at lower rates than their 
economically advantaged peers. 
 
Across California, there are also regional variations in the type of work available and the 
percentage of residents earning a living wage for their work. Jobs in the North–Far North, 
Upper Sacramento Valley, San Joaquin Valley, and Imperial regions281 are more likely to pay low 
wages than jobs in the Bay Area.282 Additionally, those living in the Central Sierra (where 70% 
earn a living wage), Sacramento–Tahoe (70%), Bay Area (67%), Central Coast (67%), and 
Orange (67%) regions are more likely to earn a living wage than those living in the Imperial 
region (55%).283 Across California’s 12 regions, those with the lowest median income are 
concentrated in more desert and rural areas (Imperial at $28,169 and Upper Sacramento Valley 
at $31,100).284 However, the San Joaquin, Inland, and Los Angeles regions, which are home to 
approximately 19 million Californians,285 have an average combined median income of 
$36,700,286 which falls below the statewide average of $45,300.287 As the data suggest, 
Californians in all regions face challenges to financial health and wellbeing. 
 
Upward economic mobility also varies regionally across the state. In particular, “children born 
in California cities [Los Angeles, Sacramento, San Francisco, and San Jose] into the bottom 
income quintile have an above-average chance of rising to the top quintile.”288 As this indicator 
suggests, economic mobility is relatively high in California’s cities overall. One possible 
explanation is the high rate of college attendance for low-income students in the state’s 
metropolitan areas, including San Francisco, San Jose, Los Angeles, San Diego, and 
Sacramento.289 Additionally, Chetty et al.290 found that mid-tier public colleges, such as 
California State University institutions, have relatively high economic mobility rates. In fact, 
California State University–Los Angeles has the highest mobility rate of all four-year 
postsecondary institutions examined across the United States, with nearly 10% of students 
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coming from families in the bottom quintile and reaching the top quintile.291 California State 
Polytechnic University–Pomona also ranked in the top ten for this metric, with a mobility rate 
of 6.8%.292 Given the important role that mid-tier public institutions play in economic mobility, 
and CSU’s track record of success in this area, it is probable that mobility in California will be 
higher in the urban areas where CSUs are more largely concentrated, further disadvantaging 
students in rural communities that lack access to these institutions.  
 
As the data highlight, disparities in educational attainment and higher education performance 
among California’s most diverse residents drive inequities in employment, economic prosperity, 
and social mobility. Even the associated benefits from postsecondary education (i.e., 
employment, income, and wealth) are largely uneven due to very inequitable starting points, 
making it difficult for the state’s diverse populations to get ahead. For these individuals, 
disadvantage begins at a young age and largely persists throughout adult life. As California’s 
population becomes increasingly diverse, the state must address racial and ethnic gaps in 
educational attainment and postsecondary performance if it wants to ensure opportunity and 
economic viability for an increasingly important subset of its residents. 
 
California’s socioeconomically disadvantaged residents face barriers to opportunity and success 
at numerous stages of the education-to-career pipeline. These individuals are not as prepared 
for college as their advantaged peers, and, when they do enroll in postsecondary education, 
they are disproportionately concentrated in two-year institutions where they are further 
saddled with a reduced likelihood of transfer or bachelor’s degree completion. For these 
students, the chance of getting ahead in life is disproportionately tied to the postsecondary 
opportunities that they can access within California. As Chetty et al.293 argue, “children from 
low- and high-income families have similar earnings outcomes conditional on the college they 
attend.” This suggests that access to college, particularly to well-performing colleges with high 
graduation and mobility rates, is positively correlated with economic prosperity for 
socioeconomically disadvantaged populations.294 Therefore, low-income individuals in California 
cannot succeed without improved postsecondary preparation, access, and completion. In order 
to get ahead, socioeconomically disadvantaged Californians need equitable access to the starting 
line. 
 
Lastly, when it comes to chance for prosperity and success in California, where you live also 
matters. Location in the state not only dictates which postsecondary institutions you can 
geographically access but also determines how well prepared you are for college-level work, 
your chance for success upon enrolling, the type of employment you can access in the 
workforce, and whether you can afford to live in a specific community based on these factors. 
Failure to examine the unique circumstances of each individual region in California can mask 
variations in higher education performance in the state and, by extension, differences in regional 
economic opportunity. 
 
                                                     
291 "Which Colleges in America Help the Most Children Climb the Income Ladder?" The Equality of Opportunity Project, 2017, www.equality-of-
opportunity.org/college/. 
292 Ibid. 
293 Raj Chetty, John Friedman, Emmanuel Saez, Nicholas Turner, and Danny Yagan, Mobility Report Cards: The Role of Colleges in 
Intergenerational Mobility, Cambridge, MA: Opportunity Insights, 2017, 2. 
294 Ibid. 
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Opportunity & Success: When Disparities Compound  
 
Disparities exist as dimensions of individual identity among California’s residents. However, 
disparities in lived experience lead to broader disparities within the state’s public postsecondary 
systems. Learners in California are sorted into the state’s very distinct sectors of higher 
education, with 52% of Californians enrolling in CCCs, 16% in CSUs, and 12% in UCs.295 As 
they are sorted into these silos, the structure of California’s public postsecondary systems puts 
some learners at a distinct disadvantage based on their lived experiences as disparities 
compound in the areas of race and ethnicity, socioeconomic status, place, and age (a factor we 
have not addressed here but that emerges as another important consideration in examining 
access, opportunity, and success in California). The differential graduation rates of the sectors, 
as referenced earlier in this report, further exaggerate disparities at the individual level as 
students exit these systems.296 
 
As California’s population becomes more diverse, and as an increasing proportion of its 
residents are born in the lower end of the income distribution, disparities in performance must 
be addressed if the state hopes to meet the needs of its workforce and fuel long-term 
economic viability. Higher education can be a solution for tackling these challenges. In fact, 
“higher education is the one place where society addresses social mobility in an economic 
way.”297 Expanding access to opportunity, particularly for California’s marginalized and lower-
income residents, is imperative for mobilizing individual chance for success. Higher education is 
a prime resource for the state to leverage in addressing these concerns. While the state’s 
public postsecondary systems have already acknowledged these issues through such efforts as 
the CCC Vision for Success,298 CSU Graduation Initiative 2025,299 and UC 2030,300 much work 
remains to be done. California must build on this momentum moving forward to eliminate 
equity gaps that manifest at all stages of life—and to ensure that its people have an equal chance 
to achieve prosperity and success. To that end, public postsecondary education in the state 
must be leveraged for the benefit of all rather than a select few.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
295 Fall 2018 enrollment data from the National Center for Education Statistics, https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/datacenter/InstitutionByName.aspx.  
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SURVEYING FRAGMENTATION IN CALIFORNIA’S HIGHER 
EDUCATION POLICY LANDSCAPE 
Elizabeth Dunens & Maya Kaul 
 
Fragmentation as Faultline 
 
In this chapter, we examine the theme of fragmentation that emerged from our analysis of 
primary and secondary data on the structure and functioning of California’s higher education 
systems and policy since 1990. Before delving into our findings on this faultline, it is necessary 
to first explain what we mean by fragmentation.  
 
Fragmentation is defined as “the process or state of breaking or being broken into small or 
separate parts.”301 As such, it is neither inherently positive nor negative, but its unique contexts, 
degree, pervasiveness, and consequences must be considered. Fragmentation can occur 
intentionally or unintentionally, and its utility can shift as situations evolve. Take as example the 
1960 Master Plan delineation of the specific roles served by each of the state’s three public 
higher education systems. This segmentation was a strategic act to mitigate mission creep and 
improve enrollment and graduation for the state’s growing student population.302 Yet, 60 years 
later, the same approach that kept the systems from stepping on each other's toes has also kept 
them from learning how to dance well with one other. Add to this the increasingly complex 
choreography required to meet statewide educational attainment and workforce needs, and it 
becomes clear: although fragmentation can be useful, we must stay alert of its limitations and 
adverse consequences.  
 
Drawing from our interviews and secondary data, we map key manifestations of fragmentation 
that influence statewide capacity for setting and implementing a consistent higher education 
agenda for the state. As visualized in Figure 11, these manifestations are organized into three 
areas: (1) Gubernatorial and legislative authority and leadership; (2) Higher education systems 
organization and missions; and (3) Accountability structures to ensure that higher education 
addresses public purposes. For each manifestation, we highlight key forces that maintain or 
exacerbate fragmentation. We conclude with a summary of the faultline’s negative 
                                                     
301“Fragmentation,” Oxford English Dictionary, accessed November 12, 2020, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/fragmentation.  
302 “Moving Past the Master Plan: Report on the California Master Plan for Higher Education,” California Competes, October, 2017, 
https://californiacompetes.org/assets/general-files/Master Plan-Report-_-with-cover-for-hearing.pdf. 
 The faultline of fragmentation in higher education policy traces across California’s 
political, legislative, postsecondary systems, and accountability structures. 
 Fragmentation in and across these domains has trickle-down consequences for 
California’s students, public, and progress.  
 Without a long-term, cross-sector vision for higher education in the state, policy 
approaches to address California’s most pressing postsecondary issues will continue to be 
piecemeal. 
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consequences and reflect on how the unprecedented challenges of 2020 might increase 
alignment or further calcify historically problematic divisions. 
 
Figure 11. Conceptual Mapping of Fragmentation Across California’s Higher 
Education Policy Landscape 
 
A Fragmented Approach to Policy in a Strong Governor State 
 
“I think that one of the beauties of higher education as a policy area is that it doesn't have to be a blue 
or a red area. Everyone across the spectrum actually has some regard and desire for us to have a 
robust and successful higher education system.”  
 
- Dr. Lande Ajose, Senior Policy Advisor for Higher Education 
Office of Governor Gavin Newsom
 
In the area of gubernatorial and legislative authority, the state employs a fragmented approach 
to higher education policy across leadership terms. In recent decades, the state’s commitment 
to higher education has not wavered significantly across administrations. Yet policy priorities 
and strategy are subject to party politics, and over the past 60 years California has had an active 
rotation between Democratic and Republican control of the governor’s seat (Table 2, see 
following page). Moreover, even with consecutive partisan control of the governorship, there can be 
discontinuity in the state’s higher education policy agenda due to differing priorities between individual 
governors. This is most recently visible in the leadership transition from Governor Jerry Brown 
(2011–2019) to Governor Gavin Newsom (2019–present).  
 
Newsom’s victory in 2018 represented the first time in over a century that the Democratic 
party experienced back-to-back gubernatorial wins in California.303 Both Brown and Newsom 
have strong track records of commitment to education. Governor Brown’s two terms have 
been characterized as “the most extensive shakeup of California’s K-12 public education system 
over any comparable period in the state’s history.”304 Scholar William Tierney described 
                                                      
303 George Skelton, “Democrats Have a Mega-Majority in the California Legislature. Expect them to Swing for the Fences,” The Los Angeles 
Times, December 3, 2018, https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-sac-skelton-democrats-legislature-supermajority-20181203-story.html.  
304 Louis Freedburg, "Landmark Reforms Championed by Gov. Brown Leave Deep Imprint on California Education,” EdSource, January 3, 2019, 
https://edsource.org/2019/landmark-reforms-championed-by-gov-brown-leave-deep-imprint-on-california-education/606576. 
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Brown’s “constant drumbeat to exert fiscal administrative prudence, to increase productivity 
and to hold down costs” as improving the state's public higher education systems.305 As 
Lieutenant Governor from 2011 to 2019, Newsom was actively engaged with California’s higher 
education segments, serving as an ex-officio Board member for both California State University 
(CSU) and the University of California (UC) systems.306 By the time he ran for governor, 
Newsom’s higher education experience was evident in his postsecondary platform. 
 
Table 2. California Governors and their Party Affiliation since 1959 
 
2019 - present Gavin Newsom (D) 
2011 - 2019 Edmund G. “Jerry” Brown (D) 
2003 - 2011 Arnold Schwarzeneggar (R) 
1999 - 2004 Gray Davis (D) 
1991 - 1999 Pete Wilson (R) 
1983 - 1991 George Deukmejian (R) 
1975 - 1983 Edmund G. “Jerry” Brown (D) 
1967 - 1975 Ronald Reagan (R) 
1959 - 1967 Edmund G. “Pat” Brown (D) 
Source: California State Library, “Governors’ Gallery,” http://governors.library.ca.gov/list.html  
Despite this consistent commitment to education, Brown and Newsom’s specific policy 
priorities have varied. The formation of California Community Colleges’ (CCC) 115th college, 
Calbright, during Governor Brown’s final term is one such example. Spearheaded by Brown and 
taking origin in an early vision he had from his first governorship,307 the initiative was allocated 
over $100 million in development funding and an annual budget of $20 million.308 Yet this 
“brainchild of a partnership between Governor Brown and Chancellor Oakley,” as one 
interviewee dubbed it, lacked support from many Democrats in the Legislature and Governor 
Newsom has come across as "sort of lukewarm [about it].”309 In spite of recent Assembly 
Higher Education committee calls to “shut that program down completely,” with the argument 
that “the money saved 310 can be better used in other places,”311 Newsom has opted to maintain 
Calbright, but with approximately $5 million in cuts from the annual budget and $40 million 
from previously appropriated funds for the college.312 It is too early to determine the 
effectiveness of the 115th California Community College, especially with the promise that 
recently appointed Ajita Talwalker Menon brings to its leadership. However, the case of 
                                                     
305 “Perspectives on Gov. Brown's Contributions to Education — and What is Yet to be Done,” EdSource, January 3, 2019, 
https://edsource.org/2019/gov-browns-major-contributions-to-education-and-what-is-yet-be-done/606540. 
306 Scott Jaschik, “Gubernatorial Winners and Higher Education,” Inside Higher Ed, November 7, 2018, 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/11/07/governors-races-and-higher-education. 
307 Daisy Gonzales (Deputy Chancellor of the California Community Colleges) in discussion with authors, April 2020. 
308 Lois Elfman, “Why California’s First Online Community College Faces a State Audit,” Diverse Education, March 18, 2020, 
https://diverseeducation.com/article/170133/. 
309 Anonymous (California higher education policy expert) in discussion with authors, March 2020. 
310 Ashley A. Smith, “Calbright College Survives in New California State Budget Agreement,” EdSource, June 23, 2020, 
https://edsource.org/2020/calbright-college-survives-in-new-california-state-budget-agreement/634292.  
311 Ashley A. Smith, "California Legislature Pushes to Close Embattled Calbright College,” EdSource, June 4, 2020, 
https://edsource.org/2020/california-legislature-pushes-to-close-embattled-calbright-college/633143.  
312The 2020-2021 Spending Plan: Higher Education,” Legislative Analyst’s Office, last modified October 16, 2020, 
https://lao.ca.gov/Publications/Report/4284  
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Calbright does exemplify how gubernatorial authority and its facilitation of leader-specific policy 
formation can lead to fragmentation in the state’s ongoing higher education policy agenda.   
Compared to some other states, California governors wield a lot of power over higher education. As 
such, variance in gubernatorial approach can have a significant impact on California’s ongoing 
higher education performance and policy strategy. Per California constitutional and educational 
codes, the governor acts as the final signatory with vetoing power on legislation,313 leads and 
enacts state budgeting,314 and makes key appointments to the boards of all three higher 
education segments315 and the California Student Aid Commission (CSAC)316 —a process that 
two systems leaders we interviewed described as “very political.”317 Apart from these more 
formalized powers, Patrick Callan, former president of the National Center for Public Policy 
and Higher Education, also observed,  
 
Whatever [the] governor puts in place will probably work fairly well as long as he's 
there. Because who's going to go screw up the Governor's initiative? People tend—even 
if they don't like it—to go along, to cooperate, to not pick any fights with the governor. 
  
Critiques and praises of specific gubernatorial actions aside, a leader-dependent approach in a 
strong governor state like California inhibits development of a long-term, macro-level policy 
strategy as well ability to sustain a long-term policy agenda.  
Four features of the California political context contribute to a parallel fragmentation in 
legislative authority: direct democracy, representative turnover, segmental power, and 'pet 
projects.’ 
 
Direct Democracy 
 
According to former College Futures Senior Advisor Jane Wellman, direct democracy is rooted 
in California’s ballot initiative system and has a "profound influence" on state budget allocations 
to education.318 Patrick Callan observed that it “introduces a volatility into public policy that 
doesn't necessarily create better things for the public,” and offered the example of Proposition 
13 to illustrate how this legislation mechanism can yield policy that addresses short-term public 
concerns (e.g., property taxes) while overlooking long-term consequences for the state. 
Historically, direct democracy has had stronger financial implications for CCC and K–12 
systems than the CSU and the UC; however, as Proposition 209’s 1996 termination of 
affirmative action demonstrates,319 direct democracy grants a significant power to the public to 
interrupt statewide higher education practice and policy goals across systems. 
 
Term Limits 
 
In 1990, Proposition 140 instituted term limits to the legislature, allowing representatives to 
serve a maximum of 6 years in the Assembly, 8 years in the Senate, and 14 years across both 
                                                     
313 “Legislative Process,” California State Senate, last modified April 2019, www.senate.ca.gov/legislativeprocess. 
314 “California’s Budget Process,” California Department of Finance, accessed June 2020, http://www.dof.ca.gov/budget/Budget_Process/index.html. 
315 “Postsecondary governance structures: California state profile,” Education Commission of the States, 2019, https://www.ecs.org/wp-
content/uploads/CaliforniaPSG.pdf.  
316 “Members of the California Student Aid Commission,” California Student Aid Commission, accessed June 2020, 
https://www.csac.ca.gov/commission-members. 
317 CCC administrators, in discussion with the authors, 2020. 
318 Jane Wellman (former College Futures Senior Advisor) in discussion with authors, March 2020. 
319 Khalil Ferguson, “Californians Have an Opportunity to Reverse Prop 209 and Reinstate Affirmative Action,” The Sacramento Bee, October 
13, 2020, https://www.sacbee.com/news/local/sacramento-tipping-point/community-voices/article246293140.html.  
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houses.320 Research from the Public Policy Institute of California found that term limits created 
“more room for fiscal irresponsibility in the Legislature . . . and less incentive, experience, and 
leadership to correct it.”321 While Proposition 28 “relaxed” term limits somewhat,322 it was not 
a full return to the days when new legislators were able to take “years learning their trade in 
various committees before becoming leaders of their party or chamber.”323 
 
Segmental Influence 
 
Term limit effects on legislative capacity may also have contributed to legislative reliance on 
segmental guidance for policy formation, a topic we explore in more detail later in this chapter. 
Our interviewees alluded to the issue of higher education systems asserting influence on 
legislative action. Colleen Moore, Assistant Director of Education Insights Center, described 
the CSU and UC systems as having “a lot of autonomy . . . [and] sway with the legislature about 
what we [the systems] need.”324  
 
Pet Projects 
 
Multiple interviews hinted at the influence of individual representatives’ pet issues in higher 
education. Among these were categorical spending allocations to CCC, as well as 
postsecondary program or campus initiatives. While Student Center Funding Formulas have 
improved the issue as it relates to categorical spending,325according to Robert Shireman, 
Director of Education Excellence at the Century Foundation, “The politics of opening of 
campuses frequently have a lot more to do with personalities in the legislature than they do 
with actual demand in the state.”326 
 
In combination, these four features present challenges to developing and implementing a 
systematic, continuous approach to statewide higher education policy formation. The salient 
manifestation of fragmentation in California’s political domain makes the state more susceptible 
to fragmentary postsecondary policy across executive and legislative leadership. In some ways, 
higher education policy is trapped in a vicious cycle, where fragmentation simultaneously contributes to 
and is caused by a lacking statewide public agenda. Structures that fuel short-term, leader-specific 
policy responses require further consideration if the state hopes to meaningfully interrupt this 
cycle. 
    
Fragmentation ‘Baked into’ the Higher Education System 
 
In addition to the fragmented nature of policymaking in California, the state’s higher education 
system is also fragmented--by design. The central legacy of the Master Plan is its clear 
delineation of the roles and purposes of each public segment of higher education, as well as the 
                                                     
320 "Proposition 28: Limits on Legislators’ Terms in Office, Initiative Constitutional Amendment,” Legislative Analyst’s Office, last modified 
February 16, 2020, https://lao.ca.gov/ballot/2012/28_05_2012.aspx.  
321 Bruce E. Cain and Thad Kousser, “Adapting to Term Limits: Recent Experiences and New Directions.” Public Policy Institute of California, 2004, 
iii–iv, https://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_1104BCR.pdf. 
322 Erin McGhee, “New Term Limits Add Stability to the State Legislature,” Public Policy Institute of California, November 12, 2018, 
https://www.ppic.org/blog/new-term-limits-add-stability-to-the-state-legislature/. 
323 “California’s Legislature. The Withering Branch,” The Economist, April 20, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/18563620.  
324 Colleen Moore (Assistant Director of Education Insights Center) in discussion with authors, April 2020. 
325 Darcie Harvey (College Futures Higher Education Policy consultant; California Community College’s Chancellor’s Office consultant) in 
discussion with authors, November 2020. 
326 Robert Shireman (Director of Higher Education Excellence and Senior Fellow at the Century Foundation) in discussion with authors, March 
2020. 
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role of private not-for-profit colleges and universities. A consequence of this design is that it 
limits, and even disincentivizes, cross-segmental collaboration due to the fragmented nature of 
decision-making and governance within and across the three segments. Furthermore, there are 
no finance mechanisms in place to counteract the resulting silo effects. Segment-level decision-
making bodies, including governing boards and academic senates, inhibit statewide alignment, 
collaboration, and capacity to work toward a public good.   
 
Segment Governing Boards 
 
Each public higher education segment in the state is led by a governing board (see Figure 4, p. 
25), which is responsible for building shared governance within its system. This distribution of 
powers has “sustained the long-term autonomy of Higher Education in a highly politicized state” 
by allowing the segments to more or less regulate themselves.327 For example, the introduction 
of the CSU’s Board of Trustees helped alleviate competition among the CSU campuses.328 The 
CCC system is distinct in that each of its 115 campuses has its own local board, which further 
fragments decision-making.329 This structure was enacted through the 1988 passing of Assembly 
Bill 1725 with the aim to make the CCCs more responsible to local communities.330 However, 
it also “shift[ed] the power of governance from the legislature to local boards,”331 and increased 
the total number of governing bodies across the three systems.  
 
These varying structural arrangements within the segments have historically exacerbated the 
complexities underlying each of the segments, limiting capacity for shared decision-making both 
across and within systems. These dynamics are further complicated by the power imbalances 
across segment boards. Most notably, the UC Board of Regents is particularly powerful, and 
comparatively more autonomous than the other two boards given that the state constitution 
affords "exclusive power to operate, control, and administer the University of California”332 
This creates an unlevel playing field in the few spaces where the three public segments do come 
together. Together, these dynamics make California’s postsecondary education approach 
“coherent but not coordinated. […] It’s a system model rather than an integrated model,” as 
higher education finance expert Jane Wellman suggested.333  
 
Academic Senates 
 
Similar to those in other states, the academic senates of California’s three public segments play 
key leadership and decision-making roles in shaping segment-level policy. Whereas the 
academic senate of the UC was prescribed by a state charter in 1868,334 the senates of the CSU 
                                                     
327 Simon Marginson, The Dream Is Over: The Crisis of Clark Kerr's California Idea of Higher Education (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
2016), 19.  
328 Simon Marginson, “And the Sky is Grey: The Ambivalent Outcomes of the California Master Plan for Higher Education,” Higher Education 
Quarterly 72, no. 1 (September 2017): 51–64.  
329 “The California Community College System” in Trustee Handbook (Sacramento, CA: The Community College League of California, 2020), 
https://www.gavilan.edu/about/trustees_orientation/docs/pres_office/CCCSystem_TrustHdbk.pdf.  
330 Ibid.  
331 “About Senates in California Community Colleges,” Skyline College, accessed November 13, 2020, 
https://www.skylinecollege.edu/academicsenate/about.php. 
332 John Aubrey Douglass, "How and Why the University of California Got Its Autonomy,” University of California, Berkeley, Center for Studies in 
Higher Education Research & Occasional Paper Series, 2015, 1, https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED559389.pdf.  
333 Jane Wellman (former College Futures Senior Advisor) in discussion with authors, March 2020. 
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and CCC were introduced in 1963 through an Assembly Concurrent Resolution.335 Segment-
wide academic senates are the primary venues for faculty voice in the UC and CSU systems. 
Because of their composition, however, these senates are empowered to prioritize narrowly-
defined “academic” issues, which can limit the ability of the state to effectively work toward the 
public good. As Robert Shireman commented:  
 
While I'm a strong supporter of shared governance, and faculty having a very strong 
role, […] it means that when you're negotiating with the Faculty Senate over the next 
program you're going to offer, it tends to go in the direction of the more traditionally 
academic, and not as much in the direction of “Hey, how could we work really closely 
with these local employers to upgrade the skills of their workers, and are there ways 
that we could be working more closely with their managers?”—the kinds of things that 
could be really creative approaches to training, but are different from the classroom 
learning approaches that traditional faculty use.336 
 
Similarly, Michael Kirst, former president of California’s State Board of Education and Professor 
Emeritus at Stanford Graduate School of Education, observed:  
 
[The] systems are run by faculty heavily. Very few faculty are interested in adult 
education, or new and short-term initiatives for increasing workforce skills . . . And 
there isn't any way to really maneuver those traditional systems in a different way. The 
community colleges are more malleable [but] UC is independent in many ways from the 
legislature. And CSU is a very difficult bureaucracy to move around. It's very ossified.337 
 
This focus on academic issues limits the ability of these bodies to address segment policy as it 
relates to larger public needs, such as responding to state or regional workforce needs. 
Furthermore, in the few spaces where shared governance is currently possible, the segments 
are still oriented to prioritize academic issues of their own segments over a broader statewide 
public interest.  
 
In the absence of strong structural arrangements or incentives to align segmental and or state 
interests, “the systems go their own ways, negotiating their own deals with the Governor and 
Legislature with the whole presumably guided by the invisible hand of the Master Plan."338 
Multiple stakeholders we interviewed commented that the current policy environment and 
state leadership do not produce a cohesive statewide higher education system. These differing 
structural arrangements, and the relative balances of power and autonomy between each 
segment and its institutions, leave unresolved the question of whose interests any given 
segment should be working towards. Patrick Callan argued: 
 
                                                     
335 “Brief History of the Academic Senate for California Community Colleges,” Academic Senate for California Community Colleges, accessed 
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I don't want to imply that they're not public spirited—but [the institutions] tend to see 
their own interests as the public interest and tend to believe “What's good for General 
Motors is good for the country.” And that's probably not entirely a bad thing. That is, 
nobody hires the university president to go out and worry about the [public] interest. 
Their job is to protect the interests of that institution. And so there needs to be some 
offsetting entity that can bring a perspective. 
 
Given the power imbalances between each of three segments of higher education, this lack of a 
clearly defined public interest leaves individual systems to set their own agendas and advocate 
in competition for limited funding. This also creates logistical differences in the ways that public 
policy operates at large. As Dennis Jones, President Emeritus of the National Center for Higher 
Education Management System, shared:  
 
Everything is done system-by-system in California, and you’ve got three systems. The 
governor sits on the governing board[s], and everything is kind of negotiated between 
the state and individual sectors.339 
 
These structural arrangements make unifying around a public interest across, and even within, 
segments an uphill battle. One of the strongest sources of evidence for this point is the impact 
the fragmentation has on the CCCs and statewide transfer policies. Although establishing clear 
transfer pathways was a central goal of the Master Plan, the highly fragmented nature of the 
CCC system today has led to establishment of separate, college-level Memoranda of 
Understanding (MOUs) for the Associate Degree to Transfer (ADT) pathways with individual 
four-year institutions, leading to “campus-to-campus rather than system-wide course 
transferability agreements.”340 Because of the piecemeal nature of MOUs, the transfer 
agreements are not consistent, with different courses required for transfer to each campus. As 
such, these transfer policies have “led to inefficiencies and low transfer rates,” impeding the 
California’s ability to conduct statewide planning related to transfer.341 While the Master Plan 
has served as a “treaty” between warring factions,342 it has left unresolved fundamental gaps in 
governance. As the state grapples with 21st century challenges cutting across higher education, 
workforce, and K–12 preparation, addressing these gaps in governance is critical to achieve 
more aligned statewide public policy that attends to differing regional needs.   
 
 “Accountable for What?”: Fragmentation in Policy Oversight 
 
When it comes the data for accountability, you have to ask first, '"Accountable for what?” And 
California has never stated, “Accountable for what?” 
 
- Dennis Jones, President Emeritus  
National Center for Higher Education Management System 
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The unresolved tensions between institutional and public interests—as exacerbated by the 
fragmentation of both public policymaking at large in the state and the public higher education 
sector in particular—are only further compounded by the parallel fragmentation in policy 
oversight. Absent statewide attainment goals each segment is left with little incentive or 
accountability to work toward a public interest. Similarly, the governor and the state legislature 
are working without a shared statewide vision for higher education and are left to prioritize the 
policy interests of specific administrations. This historic fragmentation in oversight is a prevailing 
feature of the state’s higher education sector and produces structural barriers to creating, 
sustaining, and enacting a long-term, stable vision for higher education.  
 
No Statewide Planning or Oversight Body “with teeth”  
 
The state previously had a coordinating body, the California Postsecondary Education 
Commission (CPEC); however, it has never had a body with the power to enforce 
recommendations or compel system alignment with public goals. While a formal coordinating 
body is just one potential lever for enacting a statewide strategy—and we do not argue that a 
coordinating body is necessary—the demise of CPEC speaks to historic barriers to organizing 
around a statewide public agenda. CPEC’s coordinating or accountability roles were never 
much more than a symbolic nod to the coordinating council envisioned in the Master Plan. One 
of the key challenges with CPEC was that it lacked the authority to manage conflicts between 
segmental governing boards. This is credited as one of the contributing factors behind CPEC’s 
eventual downfall. As one policy expert we interviewed reflected:  
 
One of the challenges we had with CPEC is it was told to be a planning agency, but it 
didn't have any ultimate authority to trump the decisions of the three boards. And so it 
was often considered just too weak to be meaningful. It would do a lot of work, and 
then no one would listen to the recommendations it made.343 
 
Governor Brown "axed” CPEC due to its perceived “ineffective[ness],” citing that “there [was] 
no shortage of public or private entities that study higher-education policy” in the state.344 
Although the state is home to a large number of organizations which provide research-based guidance 
to higher education policymakers and leaders, these groups alone are not a sufficient mechanism for 
achieving sustained statewide policy leadership that goes beyond any respective gubernatorial or 
legislative term. As such, there is no lack of statewide capacity when it comes to these research 
and policy organizations in the state implementation of these organizations’ ideas. In the absence 
of oversight, the governor is left to use the power of the purse as a lever of control over the 
three segments, which further limits the state’s ability to develop a meaningful statewide vision 
by promoting more piecemeal policymaking. These dynamics also run the risk of encouraging 
the segments to work out their own “deals” with the governor or legislature based on where 
they are able to find support for their budget requests, rather than being driven by a set of 
overarching public policy prioirities for the state. 
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Recognition of the Need for a Public Agenda  
 
There was an overwhelming agreement among those we interviewed that California’s public 
higher education system would benefit from greater statewide planning and oversight. At the 
same time, there was no shared consensus on what this statewide vision should look like. One 
of the central challenges of creating an effective coordinating strategy is that it would need to 
effectively advance the public interest in an ecosystem wherein individual segments are 
structurally designed to advocate for their own interests. Implicit in this framework is “a kind of 
Madisonian checks and balances idea.”345 As Dennis Jones shared, “There are a lot of people in 
California and they all recognize the need for a CPEC. But they can't agree what it ought to 
do.”346 Such a statewide strategy would also require the governor and legislature to yield some 
current power, which presents a significant political hurdle.  
 
Part of the reason for this lack of consensus is that, in a state as large and diverse as California, 
there are many distinct "players” in the higher education space. Each of these players has its 
own interests and visions for what a statewide approach to higher education should look like. 
Jennifer Pacella, Deputy Legislative Analyst at the Legislative Accountability Office, spoke to this 
point:  
 
In California, we've had a perennial tension between statewide planning and the power 
of the three segments’ governing boards to control their particular segments. On the 
one hand, many state policymakers would like to see better statewide planning. Rather 
than having a segmental perspective—that is, thinking about the world as UC or the 
community colleges see it—they instead would like to take a state approach and ask, 
“What does California need from the higher education system? Can we ensure that the 
programs being offered across the three segments are those that are most beneficial for 
students and employers?” Countering this desire for better statement planning, 
however, are the segments’ strong governing boards that have considerable authority 
for running their segment. With the administration, the Legislature, and the three 
governing boards all in positions of power and each having at least somewhat different 
perspectives and priorities, doing statewide planning effectively has been challenging.347 
 
The number of “players” in the higher education space in California speaks to the capacity of 
the system. In addition to the higher education and policy leadership in the state, a range of 
research, policy, and advocacy organizations in the state work to support the system. Colleen 
Moore argued that there is broad buy-in among this latter coalition to establish a coordinating 
entity, but the call faces resistance from the segments themselves:  
 
The research, policy, advocacy organizations in higher ed[ucation], are pretty much all 
on—as far as I know at the moment--the “pro” side of having a coordinating entity. 
Who is on the “anti-” side is the systems themselves. […] Arguably the community 
college system has less authority on its own and is more subject to the whims of the 
legislature telling them what to do. CSU and especially UC have a lot of autonomy. And 
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so, in the absence of any coordinating entity, they have a lot of sway with the 
legislature.348 
 
Any such resistance from the segments is reflective of the segmental autonomy afforded by 
current structural arrangements. Moving away from those arrangements toward greater 
statewide planning would force segments to negotiate a broader statewide, public vision for 
higher education, and to be responsive to enacting that public agenda. Establishing such a vision 
could align the work of research, policy, and advocacy organizations to more effectively support 
higher education policymaking and performance in the state.  
 
Signs of Movement Toward a Public Agenda 
 
With a new governor and fresh leadership across the UC and the CSU, there may be a policy 
window to introduce a new, statewide vision for higher education in California. Those we 
interviewed highlighted four recent initiatives in the state that reveal signs of more coordinated 
activity: (1) CCC’s Vision for Success, UC 2030, & CSU’s Graduation Initiative 2025; (2) the 
development of an integrated data system; (3) Governor Newsom’s Council for Postsecondary 
Education; and (4) Governor Newsom’s Higher Education Recovery with Equity Taskforce. 
Each reflects a potential interest in better aligning policy and practice across systems, while 
bearing a unique set of possibilities and limitations.  
 
1. CCC’s Vision for Success, UC 2030, & CSU’s Graduation Initiative 2025. Each of the public 
higher education segments have developed a formally articulated vision with operationalizable 
goals for the next 5 to 10 years. Though the particular goals within each of these visions vary, 
all of are generally focused on increasing degree attainment and closing attainment gaps. For 
example, the Vision for Success is the CCC’s “north star,” a guiding document for the community 
colleges to achieve their vision of “making sure students from all backgrounds succeed in 
reaching their goals and improving their families and communities.”349 Developed through a 
rigorous process of soliciting comments from experts and key stakeholders (including written 
comments from approximately 550 individuals),350 the Vision for Success was created to identify 
goals for the CCC system to work toward by 2022.351 Daisy Gonzales, Deputy Chancellor of 
the California Community Colleges, shared more context on the purposes and potential of the 
Vision for Success:  
 
Before this [current] Chancellor [Eloy Ortiz Oakley], so before 2016, we had never had 
a system wide strategic plan rooted in equity. This Chancellor came in and decided that 
he wanted a statewide strategic plan to address historic completion gaps that would 
eradicate racial equity gaps in our persistence and completion rates. We convened over 
60 different stakeholders in California and multiple Town Halls to collect system input.  
It took nine months from the moment that I arrived to create a strategic vision for our 
state, and that is the Vision for Success.352 
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The resulting document includes tangible goals for the system, akin to the goals represented in 
the UC’s 2030 vision and the CSU’s Graduation Initiative 2025. In this way, these segmental 
vision documents can establish clear benchmarks that will provide individual campuses, and the 
segments as a whole, greater clarity on what they are collectively working toward. These 
attempt to build a shared agenda within the otherwise highly fragmented segments and may 
present a model for how such benchmarks could be established at a statewide level. For 
example, successful system-level stakeholder engagement processes could serve as models for 
designing a scaled up, cross-system and cross-sector process to develop a statewide vision for 
higher education. Additionally, if a space was created for the segments to work together on a 
statewide visionary document, they could then work alongside one another to address regional 
needs in a more collaborative effort—taking issues like workforce alignment and transfer 
policies head on as a collective.  
 
2. California Cradle-to-Career Data System. Another potential lever for statewide planning and 
oversight is the integrated data system the state is working to establish. In 2019, the California 
State Legislature passed Assembly Bill 75,353 the California Cradle-to-Career Data System Act, 
“which sets out the requirements for the development of a statewide data infrastructure.”354 
The state is currently engaged in the design process for the data system, led by the Governor’s 
Office and WestEd. Recommendations from these groups will be issued by July 2021 for the 
state’s implementation of such a system355 There is hope within the state that this data system 
will provide policymakers an additional lever for holding systems accountable, by increasing 
transparency in segments’ performance through the provision of longitudinal systemwide data, 
which follows students from the “cradle” to their “career’ (i.e., through their whole educational 
trajectory). However, those we spoke with also suggested that a data system alone—without a 
coordinating body with the power to enforce its systematic use—may be insufficient. Colleen 
Moore commented:  
 
Ideally, you would have a data system and you would also have a body that would make 
more formalized use of it . . . I still think that if we could get the data system even 
without that, there are these fairly well-respected groups that are well resourced and 
staffed and have a lot of expertise and pent-up interest in using such a data system to 
address questions around ways to improve education policy and practice.356 
 
As Jane Wellman cautioned, the state today does not have an “information problem”357—
rather, the existing research and policy organizations in the state need support in implementing 
their own research-based recommendations. As such, questions about “what the system will 
look like, how it will be governed, who will have access to data and how privacy and security 
will be handled” are currently being discussed by the associated working committees, and will 
have major implications for what the data system looks like in practice.358 For example, 
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proposals include establishing a new statewide office and governing entity to manage the 
system.359 How these decisions shake out will influence the potential of the data system to 
support the state’s ability to develop and implement a statewide higher education agenda.  
 
3. Governor Newsom’s Council for Postsecondary Education. There was momentum during fall 
2019 with Assembly Bill 130 to reinstate CPEC; however, the bill was ultimately vetoed by 
Governor Newsom, despite the fact that he supported the creation of a coordinating body 
during his candidacy for governor.360 Instead, Newsom established a new Council for 
Postsecondary Education to advise his office on issues related to higher education and “to 
enable the various segments of higher education to work more closely and collaboratively 
together.”361 The Council includes the president and chancellors of the UC, CSU, and CCCs, as 
well as the President of the Association of Independent California Colleges and Universities.362 
Also appointed to the Council were representatives from K–12, workforce, and labor 
sectors.363 Because the Council has no formal coordinating powers, however, it is unclear 
whether it has the capacity to serve as a steward for the state’s higher education needs, or if it 
will simply act as a consulting body to the governor. As such, this approach may represent a 
means of making the existing system work better, rather addressing underlying issues, such as 
fragmentation of governance structures, head on.  
 
4. Governor Newsom’s Higher Education Recovery with Equity Taskforce. Composed of a 
diverse set of higher education stakeholders and experts, the taskforce convened by Newsom 
in August 2020 is headed by Governor Newsom’s Senior Policy Advisor, Lande Ajose. The 
membership of the taskforce includes a number of public and private higher education leaders 
in the state, as well as several out-of-state members and representatives from organizations 
such as the Institute for Higher Education Policy, the College Futures Foundation, and the 
Campaign for College Opportunity.364 According to Education First, the consulting firm 
facilitating the taskforce, the group is charged with:  
 
Produc[ing] a roadmap for the state’s education leaders, government, and philanthropic 
institutions to ensure that California’s public post-secondary institutions recover from 
the impacts of COVID-19 more integrated, equitable, and resilient than before—and 
more aligned with the economic needs of the state.365 
 
This taskforce represents a new method to addressing fragmentation in vision and higher 
education policy. In particular, Lande Ajose shared that this approach is an attempt “to really 
start to talk about what our aligned values are” through the use of “soft power.”366 While the 
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taskforce is intended to produce actionable recommendations, questions remain as to whether 
its composition, year-end deadline, and limited enforcement capacities position it for success. 
Even still, the Taskforce represents a concerted effort from state leadership to engage new 
ways to bring the segments together so that the state can be synchronized in its response to 
higher education needs during the pandemic, and beyond.  
 
Each of these initiatives and systems illustrates efforts across the state to grapple with the 
issues of fragmentation in the higher education policymaking sphere. As Lande Ajose reflected, 
“What we need is the political will to take on those things that we know are legitimate 
challenges in the system.”367 Without resolving the underlying fragmentation of decision-
making—within and across institutions—and the policymaking bodies of the state at large, the 
same structural barriers to implementing a statewide agenda will likely persist. Tackling these 
issues of governance, which are so embedded in the ways higher education policymaking 
operates, will not be easy. However, it is necessary if California is to effectively address today’s 
higher education challenges.  
 
Negative Outcomes of Fragmentation in Unprecedented Times 
 
Fragmentation in California’s political, segmental, and oversight structures presents challenges 
to the development and implementation of long-term, statewide policy strategy for 
postsecondary education. Without a cross-sector, cross-term vision, and the accountability 
structures to uphold it, policy approaches will likely continue to be piecemeal.  
 
This fragmentation ultimately has serious consequences for California’s students. Fragmentation 
in political and legislative approaches influences which student issues get prioritized and funded. 
This is especially challenging during economic downturns when resources are scarce, as 
evidenced by recent 2020–2021 higher education budget cuts to areas including career and 
technical workforce development, food pantries, and programs to support undocumented 
students.368 Fragmentation among systems also contributes to and amplifies postsecondary 
pathways issues (e.g., K–16 alignment, transfer policies across higher education segments, 
statewide student aid policies). Not only is there an ethical imperative to ensure that the 
systems and statewide policy cohesively address perennial student equity and access issues, 
there is also economic argument for it: misalignment or siloing between the systems prevents 
the state from maximizing its human capital and workforce development potential. 
Furthermore, fragmentation of segments and political structures can cause inefficiencies in the 
prioritization and use of limited financial resources. These consequences are not the fault of 
individual leaders but rather a consequence of the highly fragmented structures performing as 
they are designed to.   
 
The aforementioned signs of moving toward a public agenda hold promise for mitigating some 
of these issues, yet many unknowns remain, given the unprecedented challenges that the state 
faces in 2020. Multiple stakeholders we interviewed expressed uncertainty about what this time 
portends. Darcie Harvey, a higher education consultant working in California, commented, “I 
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think [California’s] higher ed[ucation] was not in a great place before this [pandemic]. Even 
though there had been good budget years, they were still really facing some problems. And now 
they're facing a lot more.”369 There is also the question of how higher education will be 
prioritized given the immediate health, environmental, and economic emergencies the state 
must address. Higher education has the potential to be a key strategic asset to the state in both 
responding to these emergencies in the short-run, and building statewide resilience against such 
crises in the future. However, if the issues of fragmentation that we identify are left unresolved, 
higher education may have the opposite effect.  
 
Although the governor has not abandoned the higher education reform goals outlined in his 
campaign platform, these larger state issues have impacted fiscal and leadership capacity to 
follow through on postsecondary promises as originally planned. Yet trials can also act as 
catalyzers for change, and perhaps new segmental leadership during this time of transition will 
create the conditions for finally addressing perennial, embedded faultlines like fragmentation. 
Only time will tell. 
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UNCERTAIN AND VOLATILE STATE FUNDING 
Pooja R. Patel and Lindsay Adams Van Ostenbridge 
 
Introduction 
 
Dubbed the budget “balance wheel,” higher education is often the largest discretionary fund in 
state budgets that enjoys increased appropriations during prosperous times but 
disproportionately large cuts during economic downturns.370 Higher education budgets endure 
a proportionally larger cut because institutions have the capacity to generate additional tuition 
revenue in a way that agencies such as K–12 and health services do not.371 Both nationally and 
in California, COVID-19 will further test the notion of higher education as a balance wheel as 
states contend with significant financial upheaval. 
 
Volatility of funding is prevalent in American higher education, starting with state revenues and 
appropriations and trickling down to higher education revenues, financial aid, and tuition and 
fee levels.372 This analysis defines volatility as an extreme variation and unpredictability of 
funding. Volatility is built into the system given that state funding is highly dependent on a 
changing economic, tax, and other revenue policies—and tied to states’ long-term structural 
budget deficits.373 At the state level, volatility may translate into sharp increases or decreases in 
funding across time. Such fluctuations in public funding limit long-range planning for institutions 
of higher education by creating uncertainty in their incoming revenue, which may 
unintentionally promote volatility in their own expenditures or tuition and fee levels.374  
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 Volatility in public funding limits the ability of public higher education to address critical 
public needs in California. 
 California is especially prone to volatility given its (1) heavy and longstanding reliance on 
capital gains tax and (2) constraints on property tax revenues brought about by 
Proposition 13. 
 An instability in state revenue creates fluctuations in state fiscal support for higher 
education, limiting long-range planning for institutions. Institutions tend to respond by 
decreasing access or raising tuition—or both. 
 In order to maintain access and affordability, California must address systemic problems 
that contribute to volatility. 
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We identify volatility as a faultline given our observation that such instability in public funding 
has limited the ability of public higher education to address critical public needs. While there 
are many forces contributing to volatility in California’s revenues and expenditures overall, our 
research shows that the state is especially prone to volatility given its (1) heavy and 
longstanding reliance on capital gains tax and (2) constraints on property tax revenues brought 
about by Proposition 13. This is not to understate other forces that cause volatility in public 
budgets, but the combination of the dramatic increases and declines in capital gains tax 
revenues (part of the personal income tax) and accompanying constraints of property tax 
revenue are pernicious and prevent the state from investing in its future. 
 
Volatile Revenue Trends 
 
According to the Pew Fiscal 50 analysis, California ranks fifth in the nation in tax revenue 
volatility.375 State volatility ranking is determined by “both the volatility of individual tax streams 
and the share of revenue that each stream represents.”376 While California is not alone in facing 
severe blows in revenue due to economic downturns, as Figure 12 demonstrates, California is 
more susceptible to changes in tax revenues than the national average, presenting deeper dives 
and sharper climbs since the early 2000s. 
 
Figure 12. Change in Tax Revenue California and the United States 
 
 
 
Note: Gray box identifies the Great Recession; National changes exclude California. 
 
Source: Pew, 2020. 
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Historically, California has relied on four major sources of revenue: retail and sales tax, 
personal income tax, corporate tax, and estate tax. Over the last 70 years, there has been a 
decisive shift in the share of the four revenue sources and their contribution to the state 
budget.377 Figure 13 shows California's revenue sources from 1951 through 2011 and projected 
into 2021. In 1951, 59% of total revenue came from retail sales and use tax while 11% of total 
revenue came from personal income tax. By 1991, this revenue pattern had dramatically shifted, 
with 35% of the total revenue coming from retail sales and use tax and 45% from personal 
income tax. This sharp increase in reliance on personal income tax has continued, and, by 2021, 
is expected to make up 67% of total state revenues. Personal income tax revenue is composed 
of several income types, ranging from wages and salaries to capital gains tax. Of these 
categories, capital gains tax has proved to be most unpredictable, subject to high levels of 
fluctuation given its close tie to the stock market. As the share of revenues derived from 
personal income tax has increased over the decades, so has California’s reliance on capital gains 
tax.  
 
Figure 13. California Revenues by Source, 1951–2021 
 
 
 
Note: * = estimate 
 
Source: California Department of Finance, 2020b. 
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Approximately 10% of California's budget is a result of revenues derived from capital gains tax. 
Due to its connection with stock market performance, this has meant that, in good economic 
times, capital gains revenue tends to be high, and, in bad times, it declines rapidly. Prior to the 
Great Recession of 2008, 9% of the state general budget (approximately $9 billion of the $101 
billion total general fund tax revenues) was a result of the tax revenue derived from capital 
gains taxation. Following the recession in 2009, capital gains dropped by more than half to less 
than 5% (or $4 billion of $82 billion). The share of these revenues stabilized to pre-recession 
levels at around 10% four years after the recession in 2012.378 The unpredictability and general 
volatility in the state budget has had serious implications for state expenditures. 
For fiscal year 2021, California projects spending $134 billion as part of general fund 
expenditures.379 Figure 14 shows that state expenditures in California have increased steadily 
since 1987. Medicaid and elementary and secondary education account for the largest areas of 
state spending. Over time, the share of state funding allocated to elementary and secondary 
education and Medicaid has also increased substantially. Relative to these, the increases in the 
state of higher education funding have been marginal.  
 
Figure 14. California State Expenditures by Function 
 
 
 
Source: National Association of State Budget Officers, 2019. 
 
As California continues to grapple with the economic fallout from COVID-19, overall state 
revenues are down by approximately 21%, and the budget for the current fiscal year (2021) 
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faces a $54.3 billion deficit.380,381 This will have serious implications for state higher education 
funding—the states’ longstanding balance wheel. 
 
State revenues strongly determine overall fiscal support for higher education in a given year. 
Volatility in state revenues results in sharp increases or decreases in state higher education 
funding over time. Figure 15 illustrates the annual percent change in state fiscal support 
(appropriations and financial aid) for higher education in California compared to the U.S.382 In 
fiscal year 2019, there was a 7% increase in state fiscal support for higher education in 
California compared to the 5% national average. However, in fiscal year 2009, when states first 
felt the true effects of the Great Recession, state fiscal support dropped by approximately 14% 
in California but only 4% nationally. These trends further show that good times are exceedingly 
beneficial for higher education in California while bad times are especially harsh.  
 
Figure 15. Annual Percent Change in State Fiscal Support for Higher Education 
 
 
Source: Center for the Study of Education Policy, 2020. 
 
Given the volatile nature of tax revenue trends in California and its impact on state fiscal 
support for higher education, the recession induced by COVID-19 is sure to have negative 
consequence for higher education funding in the state. In an interview with Lande Ajose, Senior 
Policy Advisor for Higher Education for the Office of the Governor, Ajose noted that prior to 
COVID-19, California was anticipating a budget surplus but now faces a deficit of $54 billion for 
fiscal year 2021.383 “You know, it’s like whiplash. It’s not just a dream deferred; it feels like dreams 
                                                     
380 “Coronavirus (COVID-19): Revised State Revenue Projections,” National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), accessed November 2020, 
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dashed. Now, having said that, I think the governor is very committed to doing what he can, but 
it’s hard to imagine how we’ll be able to do any meaningful investments in the coming year.”384 
 
If the above trends in revenue volatility and the 
ensuing volatility in state fiscal support for higher 
education continue, California’s colleges and 
universities need to brace themselves for a period of 
drastic reduction in state education appropriations. 
Given the revenue trends during recessions since the 
early 2000s, California is looking at a multiyear 
recovery period before revenues stabilize to pre-
COVID-19 levels. This is especially troubling due to 
the limits on revenue generation imposed by 
Proposition 13.  
 
Additional Funding Limitations 
 
Our research posits that California is especially prone to volatility due to the state’s heavy 
reliance on income and capital gains taxes. While Proposition 13 and Proposition 98 do not 
contribute to the occurrence of volatility in the state per se, Proposition 13 has a noteworthy 
impact on revenue generation, and Proposition 98 impacts the level of funding toward K–14 
education. In this way, Propositions 13 and 98 impact the severity of volatility. Proposition 13 
constrains property tax revenues that could help compensate for lost revenue during turbulent 
times, and Proposition 98 establishes a constant guaranteed level of funding to K–14 education, 
regardless of California’s economic state. 
 
Prop 13 Imposes Limitations on Property Tax Revenue that Worsen California’s Fiscal Reality  
 
Passed by California voters in 1978, Proposition 13 caps property taxes at 1% of a property’s 
assessed value. Each subsequent year, a property’s taxable value is only able to be increased by 
the inflation rate or 2%—whichever is lower. Additionally, property taxes are only able to be 
reassessed at the sale of a property.385 The Legislative Analyst’s Office noted the dramatic effect 
the Proposition had on property tax revenues: In the year after Proposition 13 was approved, 
property tax payments dropped by roughly 60%.386 This drop was due to many Californians’ 
property taxes being decreased; the average property tax rate in California was 2.67% at the 
time.387 To help better understand the fiscal impact, Mac Taylor of the Legislative Analyst’s 
Office noted that in inflation-adjusted dollars, Proposition 13 reduced California’s cities’ and 
counties’ property tax revenues by almost $10 billion in the first year. This limitation on 
generating revenue combines with a minimum-funding level in K-14 education to limit available 
funds for higher education.  
 
 
 
                                                     
384 Lande Ajose (Senior Policy Advisor for Higher Education Office of Governor Gavin Newsom) in discussion with authors, August 2020. 
385 Mac Taylor, “Common Claims About Proposition 13,” Legislative Analyst’s Office, September 2016, 
https://lao.ca.gov/reports/2016/3497/common-claims-prop13-091916.pdf.   
386 Ibid., 366. 
387 Ibid., 366. 
 
“California is more dependent on 
capital gains than most states 
and, as a result, its general fund 
revenue volatility is greater than 
every other state…the swing is 
much greater.”  
Jane Wellman  
Higher Education Policy Expert 
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Prop 98 is an Educational Funding Guarantee that Limits the Amount of Funds to Education  
 
Passed in 1988, Proposition 98 established a minimum annual funding requirement for K–14 
education, known as the “minimum guarantee.” While the funding formula for Proposition 98 is 
complex, it was established to secure a minimum percentage of monies from the General Fund 
and local property tax revenues for K–14 education. However, in practice, it very much 
established a minimum funding level, with the government at times needing to tap into funding 
sources other than the General Fund to meet the promised amount.388 Joni Finney noted that 
while Proposition 98’s “minimum guarantee” was intended to be a funding floor, it has turned 
into a funding ceiling over time due to funding volatility.389 
 
In volatility terms, Propositions 13 and 98 are both remarkably stable. However, both propositions 
tie the state’s hands, with Proposition 13 structurally limiting revenue, and 98 structurally 
guaranteeing a non-negotiable minimum level of funding. A local revenue source, property taxes 
represent the second largest source of government revenue for California behind personal 
income tax. And while a great amount of income is generated, this revenue pales in comparison 
to the amount of revenue there would be without Proposition 13 or with even modest reforms 
to property taxes, which could help offset the budget deficits and withstand volatility. In 
November 2020, Proposition 15 was a modest attempt at property tax reform. While the 
measure did not pass, its aim was to increase funding for public schools, community colleges, 
and local government services by changing the tax assessment on commercial and industrial 
properties worth over $3 million. With Proposition 15 being voted down, local governments 
will not receive the estimated $6.5 to $11.5 billion in additional tax revenue Proposition 15 
would have generated that could have helped offset budget deficits.390  
 
Implications of Volatility and College Affordability  
 
Volatility has serious implications for California and impacts higher education access and 
affordability. During times of economic downturn, virtually all areas of the state budget face 
budgetary cuts; however, higher education is disproportionately affected by budget cuts. The 
uneven nature of these cuts puts the higher education sector in a bind.  
As demonstrated in Figure 15, California’s institutions have experienced greater instability in 
state fiscal support than institutions elsewhere in the nation due to volatility in California’s 
revenue stream. This makes state appropriations an unpredictable and unreliable revenue 
source for California’s colleges and universities. The inability to rely on consistent state funding 
creates great challenges for these institutions. Their ability to plan for the long-term are 
affected, and the instability of state support forces institutions to rely on a more predictable 
and stable source of revenue: tuition.391 392 
 
                                                     
388 Peter Shragg, California: America’s High-stakes Experiment (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2018), 198. 
389 Dr. Joni Finney, in discussion with authors, February 27, 2020.  
390 “Proposition15, November 3, 2020 Ballot,” Legislative Analyst’s Office, accessed November 2020, https://lao.ca.gov/ballot/2020/Prop15-
110320.pdf.  
391 “Securing the Public Trust: Practical Steps toward Higher Education Finance Reform in California,” College Futures Foundation, January 2017, 
https://collegefutures.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Securing_Public_Trust_REPORT_Jan2017.pdf. 
392 Ibid., 353. 
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Over the last two decades, inflation-adjusted tuition and fees have soared among institutions in 
both the University of California (UC) and California State University (CSU) systems.393 Tuition 
(referred to as “fees” in the state) at California’s public universities doubled during the Great 
Recession but has only increased by 2.5% at the UC system since 2012 and has not increased at 
CSUs, due in part to gubernatorial pressure.394 Regardless, tuition rates are the highest they 
have ever been at all three systems in fiscal year 2020–2021: $14,100 at UC395, $5,472 at 
CSU,396 and $1,104 at California’s Community Colleges (CCCs).397 Figure 16 shows the 
percentage of state appropriations versus net tuition (total tuition and fee revenues minus 
state-funded financial aid and institutional discounts) per full-time-equivalent enrollment (FTE) 
from 2000 through 2019.398  
 
Figure 16. Share of Revenue from State Appropriations vs. Net Tuition per FTE 
 
 
 
Source: State Higher Education Executive Officers, 2020. 
                                                     
393 Anthony Walsh and Peter Granville, "8 Things You Should Know About College Affordability in California,” The Century Foundation, January 
10, 2020, https://tcf.org/content/commentary/8-things-know-college-affordability-california/?session=1&agreed=1. 
394 Larry Gordon, “Cal State Pledges to Freeze Tuition in Response to Governor’s Budget Plan” EdSource, January 22, 2019, 
https://edsource.org/2019/cal-state-pledges-to-freeze-tuition-in-response-to-governors-budget-plan/607537. 
395 “Tuition & Cost of Attendance,” Admissions, University of California, accessed October 1, 2020, 
https://admission.universityofcalifornia.edu/tuition-financial-aid/tuition-cost-of-attendance/. 
396 “CSU Tuition,” Tuition & Fees, The California State University, accessed October 1, 2020, https://www2.calstate.edu/attend/paying-for-
college/csu-costs/tuition-and-fees. 
397 Hans Johnson, Jacob Jackson, and Courtney Lee, “Higher Education in California: Making College Affordable,” Public Policy Institute of 
California, October 2019, https://www.ppic.org/publication/higher-education-in-california-making-college-affordable/. 
398 Ibid., 372. 
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Trends outlined in Figures 15 and 16 reveal a pattern of funding instability for higher education. 
When faced with shrinking state fiscal support, higher education responds by decreasing access, 
raising tuition, or both. This is seen by an increasing share of net tuition revenue per FTE and 
declining enrollments. This causes a ripple effect in the state impacting access and affordability 
for students and families—and puts an increased strain on the state’s financial aid system. 
The Cal Grant is the largest state financial aid (grant) program, and its benefits allow at least 
half of students enrolled in California’s three public segments to pay no tuition. Because Cal 
Grant awards are indexed to tuition, when tuition rises, the state’s contribution to Cal Grant 
rises as well. Additionally, despite substantial state contribution, there are students who are 
eligible for Cal Grant but who do not receive it due to its stringent criteria and limited 
availability.399,400 Policymakers in the state are currently modernizing the Cal Grant program to 
remove eligibility barriers based on age, time out of high school, and GPA.401  
 
While California has done an admirable job in maintaining its commitment to state financial aid, 
volatility in state funding has limited state appropriations to higher education and caused tuition 
to partly make up for lost revenue.402 As Figure 16 outlines, the student and family share of 
higher education revenues increases rapidly during periods of economic recession—at a time 
when people can least afford it.403 When the economy stabilizes, a new level is established. As 
such, the goal post keeps moving as students and families are saddled with providing a higher 
and higher portion of revenues for higher education.  
 
While the median household income in California is higher than the national average ($78,105 
vs. $68,703), as noted in the Disparities chapter of this report, median income data mask the 
true reality of income inequality and persistent wealth gaps in California. Issues around college 
affordability are persistent. In a report examining attainment growth, the National Center for 
Higher Education Management Systems gave California an F on affordability for low-income 
students.404 A California student attending college requires 16% of family income on average to 
attend a public two-year college, 20% to attend a public four-year nondoctoral institution, and 
27% to attend a public research institution.405 So, even if a student can access higher education, 
they may not be able to afford it.  
 
In California, issues around volatility and fragmentation in governance (as identified in the 
Fragmentation chapter of this report) make the state less able to respond during fiscal crises, 
which in turn leads to the likelihood of further financial cuts to higher education, and thus 
perpetuating “an ongoing cycle of decline.”406 In order to break this cycle, California must 
                                                     
399 Ibid., 374.  
400 The Institute for College Access & Success, “How to Expand Financial Aid in California,” The Institute for College Access and Success, April 17, 
2017, https://ticas.org/wp-content/uploads/legacy-files/pub_files/cca_coalition_recommendations_april_2017.pdf. 
401 “Cal Grant Modernization, A Vision for the Future” California Student Aid Commission, March 6, 2020, 
https://www.csac.ca.gov/sites/main/files/file-attachments/cal_grant_modernization_report_legislature.pdf?1583522224. 
402 “Securing the Public Trust: Practical Steps toward Higher Education Finance Reform in California,” College Futures Foundation, January 2017, 
20, https://collegefutures.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Securing_Public_Trust_REPORT_Jan2017.pdf. 
403 Ibid., 373. 
404 “Grading Educational Attainment Improvement in California Progress to 60X25,” National Center for Higher Education Management Systems, 
May 26, 2017, https://collegecampaign.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/2017-Grading-Educational-Attainment-Improvment-in-California-
FINAL.pdf. 
405 Institute for Research on Higher Education, “College Affordability Diagnosis: California,” University of Pennsylvania Graduate School of 
Education, 2016, https://www.gse.upenn.edu/pdf/irhe/affordability_diagnosis/California_Affordability2016.pdf. 
406 William Doyle and William Zumeta, "State-level responses to the access and completion challenge in the new era of austerity," The ANNALS 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 655, no. 1 (2014): 79–98. 
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address the systemic structures that make state funding volatile, because shifting the burden of 
cost to students and families is not a sustainable strategy for predictable higher education 
funding. 
 
Conclusion and Policy Considerations 
 
Intentionally or not, California has made itself susceptible to volatility. A heavy reliance on a 
volatile source of revenue combined with limitations imposed on property tax revenues by 
Proposition 13 has created the perfect storm to exacerbate uncertainty and volatility in state 
funding. Uncertainty in the state budget has been detrimental to higher education because 
fluctuations in public funding limit long-range planning for institutions. In light of such 
unpredictability in state revenue levels, institutions have come to increasingly rely on tuition 
revenue. This shift in revenue sources has left students and families to bear a greater cost 
burden of higher education.  
 
Figure 17. The Shifting Burden of Cost  
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While COVID-19 is having a deep financial impact on California, it is simply a shock to a system 
that was already very volatile given its heavy reliance on a source of funding subject to extreme 
highs and severe lows. If the current state of revenue generation continues, higher education 
will undoubtedly face more uncertainty in the years to come. The ongoing financial crisis is sure 
to have a lasting impact on California and its higher education system. In discussing the potential 
financial effects of COVID-19, Jane Wellman noted the significance of these impacts on higher 
education: “…undoubtedly [higher education] is going to face budget cuts, whether it’s also 
tuition increases or closures of institutions, who knows?—the past is unlikely to be the 
prologue because this is probably going to be a longer and deeper disruption than we’ve seen, 
even possibly since the Great Recession.”407 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
407 Jane Wellman (Higher Education Policy Expert) in discussion with authors, March, 2020.  
 
Suggested chapter citation:  
Patel, P.R., & Van Ostenbridge, L.A. (2020). Uncertain and Volatile State Funding. In T.K. Odle, & J.E. 
Finney (Eds.), "Faultlines" Shaping Higher Education Policy and Opportunity in California (pp. 61-71). 
Philadelphia, PA: Institute for Research on Higher Education, University of Pennsylvania Graduate School 
of Education. 
   
 
“FAULTLINES” SHAPING HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY AND OPPORTUNITY IN CALIFORNIA   72 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
Joni E. Finney & Taylor K. Odle 
 
California’s future prosperity and civic wellbeing rests on its ability to educate far more diverse 
learners, yet the state faces serious and deep educational disparities in terms of race, 
socioeconomic status, and region of the state. The individual benefits from postsecondary 
education in terms of employment opportunities and achieving some prospect of economic 
mobility vary greatly by these factors, as described earlier in this report and documented in 
numerous statewide reports.  
 
The once highly regarded California Master Plan for Higher Education (1960–1975) was a public 
policy blueprint supported by Governor Pat Brown and developed by UC President Clark Kerr 
through a process of compromise and consultation. Most importantly, it addressed the large 
tidal wave of students entering higher education in the latter half of the 20th century and 
provided both structural and finance policies that ensured a clear delineation of responsibilities 
and roles among its three newly established segments of higher education. It also provided for 
need-based student financial aid and included the not-for-profit independent sector in serving 
public purposes. The Master Plan’s forward-thinking approach provided California with the 
motivation and leadership, both state and institutional, to expand its higher education system 
for Californians who would benefit from postsecondary education for the next few decades. 
The California Master Plan allowed for the orderly growth of higher education and allowed the 
state to address the twin goals of meritocracy and access, as they were understood by leaders 
at the time. It was studied internationally and set the bar for many states as they planned the 
growth for their systems of higher education. Several subsequent reviews of the Master Plan, 
roughly every ten years, reinforced its basic structure, even while California was experiencing 
rapid demographic, economic, and social change. Yet important aspects of the plan have fallen 
by the wayside (e.g., location of campuses based on demographic growth, affordable fees, etc.) 
while the state is left primarily with a structure that is no longer suited for the needs of the 
21st century. It also abandoned any attempt to coordinate the work among the systems to 
ensure that public purposes were being met. 
 
California’s disparities in higher education performance must be tackled within an increasingly 
fractured political environment characterized by conflicting voter referenda, sharp regional 
ideologies, limits on legislative authority, longer-term structural budget deficits, and wild swings 
in state revenue. These disparities must also be addressed within a public policy infrastructure 
lacking long-term state policy stewardship for higher education, which has instead operated as a 
series of gubernatorial compacts that lasted until the next inevitable recession. These actions 
have solidified the historical higher education silos and the public finance policies that reinforce 
the very disparities that should be ameliorated. Recent efforts by Governor Newsom, following 
previous ones by Governor Brown, are inadequate in their ability to go beyond the 1960 
California Master Plan for higher education. The state’s issues transcend individual leaders and 
are structural in nature, resulting from decades of chronic inattention to the faultlines outlined 
in this report. We believe that the good institutional practices and segment initiatives are 
noteworthy but not strong enough to address the deep divides in educational and lifetime 
outcomes for a growing portion of Californians.  
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Educational disparities place California on the precipice of a public policy crisis in higher 
education. The three public segments and their individual institutions are delivering the results 
that state leaders want, but not what California needs. The public policies that form the 
backbone of this structure are not only in need of reform but also require sustained attention 
in the years to come. Retrofitting a mature system of higher education will not be an easy or 
short-term process. This process is one that can be fraught with political difficulty, but a new 
blueprint is possible to guide the state for the next few decades as it reduces educational 
disparities and their associated lifetime outcomes.   
 
We make these recommendations recognizing the serious public policy challenges consuming 
California elected officials, including the ravaging effects of climate change, the growing 
problems of homelessness, and the pandemic and its associated economic recession. Higher 
education has not only proven to be a strategic asset for states when addressing workforce 
competitiveness and individual opportunity, but California’s higher education sector could also 
be leveraged to help deal with these other issues. It is for these very reasons that Governor 
Newsom should rely on a statewide Blue Ribbon Commission to help him retrofit higher 
education in the decades beyond his own term in office.  
 
The following recommendations, we believe, can place California on a trajectory toward 
recreating a system of higher education that can both meet the needs of contemporary life and 
truly earn California the often-claimed mantra as “best in the world.”  
 
Recommendations 
 
Reducing and eliminating gaps in performance must be the primary and substantive statewide 
policy agenda for California higher education. This agenda should be inclusive of gaps related to 
race, socioeconomic status, and region. 
 
Many California leaders we spoke with were reluctant to follow the path of other states in 
establishing numerical goals for educational attainment. Many see them as unrealistic or not 
helpful and imposed by outside entities. Whether the state establishes educational attainment 
goals or not, understanding how the state performs in higher education on behalf of Californians 
in closing persistent and obstinate gaps is the only way that state government is accountable to 
Californians for establishing a fair playing field for educational opportunity and its associated 
benefits. Further, reporting to the public on these outcomes and actions taken to reduce 
disparity is a central responsibility of state government. To date, California’s higher education 
performance falls well below the level required of its diverse populous and rapidly developing 
workforce. While some progress has been made to reduce disparities along dimensions of race, 
socioeconomic status, and region, large gaps still remain that are likely to become harder—not 
easier—to ameliorate given the state’s fragmented policy and governance structure and 
increasing volatility in public funds for higher education. This reality means that Californians’ 
futures are strongly determined by their race, socioeconomic status, and region from birth. 
Eliminating this predetermination must be a central aim of California’s higher education sector. 
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The governor, with input from legislative leadership, should establish a statewide Blue Ribbon 
Commission representative of California’s stakeholders in higher education. Business leaders, 
leaders of major advocacy groups, regional representation, and educational leaders should 
comprise this Commission. 
 
The Commission’s substantive charge should be to comprehensively address a public agenda to 
reduce the disparities in performance described in this report. A public agenda is long term 
strategy for higher education that plans for the next generation of students and the institutions 
that serve them. The Commission should comprehensively examine alternative statewide 
governance, funding, and accountability policies that can be used to reduce disparities and link 
higher education to individual opportunity and workforce needs. The Commission should draw 
on the work of both the Governor’s Task Force on Business and Jobs Recovery and the new 
California Higher Education Recovery with Equity Taskforce. While this latter initiative of 
Governor Newsom is critically important, it does not go far enough in the scope of its work. A 
taskforce that does not consider the structural and financial inequities that reinforce disparity in 
higher education outcomes will naturally be limited in its impact. The existing higher education 
taskforce’s membership is notable in that its membership consists of innovative leaders who 
understand best practices nationwide, yet its limitation is that it appears to try to solve the 
problems confronting higher education within the very structure and finance mechanisms that 
reinforce disparities. The work of the proposed Commission should be staffed by full-time 
professionals, and its chair(s) should work to gather input from a broad group of stakeholders 
who depend on the future of California higher education, including business leaders, leaders of 
major advocacy organizations, leading California citizens from all regions of the state, and 
national policy experts. 
 
The critical need is to develop a model for statewide stewardship of higher education that 
reduces educational disparities by race, socioeconomic status, and place. The chronic lack of 
public policy priorities and a long-term mechanism to address them compounds these issues. The 
goodwill among all relatively new public higher education segment heads is optimistic but is still 
not a substitute for a statewide commitment and sustained public stewardship for this strategic 
asset the state can use to address myriad problems.  
 
The agenda for the Blue Ribbon Commission should: 
 
Establish regional education systems, governed regionally, to improve educational opportunities 
and reduce educational disparities.  
 
As detailed in this report, educational and economic opportunities for Californians are sharply 
determined by where they live, and the state’s growing regions—which concentrates 
demographic, economic, and educational inequities within diverse geographic bounds. Today’s 
educational disparities are too wide and deep to be resolved within the existing silos of higher 
education. These structures discourage a smooth transition of students from high school to 
postsecondary education, from community colleges to comprehensive or research universities, 
and ultimately from higher education to the workforce. Most students transfer from their local 
community college to their local university. Many are employed in the local region in which they 
were educated and lived. The siloed approach also underutilizes the state’s independent 
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colleges and universities can assist in addressing these regional educational disparities. If 
reducing disparity accounted for regional contexts and considered the use of state and regional 
resources, it is likely California would make progress on an agenda to close gaps between 
groups.  
 
No map exists to identify specific regions that would be organized across the higher education 
sectors and link to (or develop) workforce opportunities of the region. This work should be 
undertaken by the Blue Ribbon Commission. While a more regional approach to higher 
education may result in the perception of further fragmentation at a macro level, bringing 
diverse stakeholders and state resources together at a more local level—regardless of current 
“system” membership—provides for a much more cohesive higher education–workforce 
ecosystem and allows each partner to tailor its approach and activities given the needs within 
each region. At the same time, however, the state must also simultaneously develop a 
mechanism for the sustained public stewardship of higher education, including policies to 
support the work of regional activities, particularly in the areas of finance and accountability. 
Without both components (regional education systems and a sustained public stewardship 
mechanism), it is likely that educational gaps will persist, and California will continue to 
underperform in higher education. 
 
A charge to the Blue Ribbon Commission should be to undertake such a study in terms of 
thinking through a regionally reflective and regionally responsive strategy. An understanding of 
any constitutional limitations and opportunities to address this agenda would be necessary, but 
the Commission must find a way to reduce the fragmentation within higher education and take 
into account regional educational needs in order to close educational disparities in the state. 
The state is not without a host of both traditional and creative options to address its problems 
as it works to repair its fragmented structures or to design new ones, but its will to use these 
options will ultimately determine if the state is able to reduce these disparities.  
 
Any new systems of higher education based on regions of the state must have a strategy to 
ensure that statewide needs are met and that gaps in educational opportunities are addressed. 
While we do not have a specific recommendation about how the state establishes regional 
education systems, the plan must also allow for the development of public finance policies and 
policies that hold regions accountable in a publicly transparent way for reducing gaps in 
disparities of opportunity by race, socioeconomic status, and region of the state.  
 
Consider the public finance principles to guide a statewide strategy to reduce educational 
disparities. 
 
Commission members must be engaged with other leaders in California in an ongoing 
conversation about the fiscal health of the state and its education systems. To the extent that 
the state is considering changes to tax policy, rainy day funds, public pensions, ballot initiatives 
that influence education funding, or other similar matters, top civic and business leaders in the 
state must intentionally consider the impact of changes for higher education. If higher education 
remains the “balance wheel” of state budgets, this strategic state asset is unlikely to reduce 
disparities and workforce opportunities. The present insensitivity to these realities has 
compounded the volatile nature of education appropriations in the state and led to rapidly 
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escalating yet unpredictable college prices, realities that not only have real impacts on the 
state’s financial aid programs but also on families’ budgets. 
 
We realize that it is unrealistic to completely insulate higher education from the swings in the 
economy, but steps can and should be taken to minimize its influence in its role as a “budget 
balancer.”  For example, during difficult times some states have dedicated tax revenues for 
higher education to draw on in economic downturns and developed a higher education rainy 
day fund from general tax revenue. At the same time, commission members can and should 
expect productivity improvements from higher education. Many options for productivity can be 
explored for different types of institutions. Even within each of the three existing segments, 
there is a fairly wide range of productivity outcomes related to their missions; these 
productivity issues are not limited only to undergraduate education but apply to graduate 
education and research competitiveness as well. 
 
In addition to considering the broad public finance issues of California, commission members 
must consider how the state uses its funding for higher education. State appropriations for 
institutional operations, state need-based financial aid, and tuition policies must be taken into 
account and must be developed in concert to support regional systems in reducing educational 
disparities. The public finance of California higher education currently reinforces these 
disparities by providing significantly more resources per student to those who are already most 
advantaged educationally, with students from higher income families, for example, receiving the 
largest state subsidies for their education—a feature that is “baked into” the finance policies of 
each public system. Further, while per-student support varies widely from the state’s 
community colleges to its research universities, the current subsidization process is not 
designed to improve student outcomes and reduce educational disparities. Rather, research 
universities receive such premiums for the research they undertake. While institutional 
appropriations for the research universities far exceed per-student funding for the 
comprehensive and community college sectors, these latter two groups will bear the lion’s 
share of work to educate the state’s rapidly diversifying population. Progress to reduce 
disparities is nearly impossible under the current financing policies, yet the state must examine 
how its funding is structured and what incentives the state wants to provide—and what 
behaviors it wants to reward.  
 
Since it is possible that public funding on a per-student basis will not return to pre-recession 
levels any time soon, if ever, it means that the state must seriously consider how to fund 
research, as a great deal of funding is directed for research. Currently, the per student subsidy 
provides a much lower teaching load at the University of California than the per student 
subsidy at California State University or the Community Colleges. This is a public subsidy for 
research, and it treats all UC faculty the same, regardless of individual productivity or priority 
research needed by the state in the areas of climate change, homelessness, health care or for 
other important public problems. We are not suggesting that the state stop subsidizing research 
but rather encouraging the state to consider ways it might prioritize the most productive and 
promising research programs and how research can address critical priorities in the state. 
Reducing educational disparities inevitably requires rethinking state priorities for higher 
education and carefully targeting funding to the colleges and universities that serve most 
California students.  
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For students and families, the state’s highly regarded Cal Grant program should also come 
under scrutiny by commission members. The fiscal limitation of scholarships for eligible 
students, and the further limitation of Cal Grants for tuition payments rather than for total 
educational costs, undermines the impact the program could have in reducing educational 
disparities and reinforces inequalities for students along regional and socioeconomic lines. In 
this regard, tuition must be another agenda item for the commission. Students and families, 
particularly in times of recession or slow economic growth, pay a growing portion of family 
income for tuition, room and board, and mandatory fees. These increased educational costs 
also reinforce existing disparities and even further separate students from equal access to 
educational and economic opportunity along dimensions of race/ethnicity, socioeconomic 
status, and region.  
 
Establish a system of public accountability to monitor regional efforts to address educational 
disparities. 
 
Reporting publicly on how state dollars are spent and on progress in reducing educational 
disparities is a central role of state government. There appears to be political commitment to 
build a statewide student unit database to systematically track students in the state from K-12 
through higher education and into the workforce. Many advocates see the development of such 
a database as necessary for monitoring California’s progress, even absent a mechanism for state 
policy stewardship that would use such a database for decision making. While a state 
longitudinal data system may help with systematic tracking of students, it cannot substitute for 
statewide leadership for closing gaps in disparities in educational outcomes and their benefits. 
Who will track and report on these data? Who will evaluate California’s new programs? Who 
will have the authority to wield this knowledge to make meaningful change for Californians? It is 
likely that the fragmented structure of the higher education sector—between systems, the 
workforce, and the California Student Aid Commission—would make the implementation of 
such a database particularly complex given its expected payoffs. However, any decisions about 
the database should fall to a newly formed body that would provide the long-term public 
stewardship for higher education in the state. 
 
Establish a mechanism for sustained state policy leadership for California Higher Education. 
 
California lacks a long-term policy process, or mechanism to serve as a public steward of higher 
education policies, including the collection of any data related to this agenda. The public 
stewardship for the next generation of Californians cannot be accomplished by short-term state 
compacts or taskforces or within gubernatorial or legislative terms. We also do not believe it 
can be accomplished by regular meetings of system heads, as valuable as they might be. Leaders 
will come and go, but policies must be put into place that ensures that the disparities in higher 
education be ameliorated. This report suggests that regionally governed systems supported 
through strong finance and accountability policies are the way forward. Having said this, an 
entity or entities must represent the state and public interests in overseeing this agenda. States 
have different ways to provide for the public stewardship of higher education, and California 
may learn from some aspects of these models. There is no one right model for all states. The 
model for California will be one that ensures that the public interests are paramount in the 
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public discourse of higher education and that the public policies adopted will provide for 
individual opportunity and workforce options for all students who enter some form of 
postsecondary education.  
 
Conclusion 
 
California’s rich history of establishing a system of higher education to serve public needs is 
indeed notable. This success should not deter state leaders from asking questions about the 
long-term future of higher education for the state. Too much is at stake for the state to rest on 
its past success. State leaders, particularly elected officials, owe all Californians the 
opportunities presented by our new economy and culture, just as Governor Pat Brown and 
Clark Kerr understood their public responsibilities to the people of the state in 1960. These 
leaders did not follow a blueprint, as one was not available to them. They invented the future of 
higher education. The call to action is no less urgent for today’s leaders. We have condence 
that if elected officials understand higher education as one of the most important strategic 
assets at the state’s disposal, they can act. If they fall into the hubris of the “best in the world” 
moniker, little is likely to change, and the futures of many Californians may not be brighter due 
to the significant disparities in individual opportunity for its diverse population. In a very real 
sense, as one of the policy thought leaders that we interviewed reminded us, “this is a demand 
side problem;” the demand for a better future must come from state leaders. The state must 
provide for the sustained public stewardship for this valuable asset and how it responds to 
individual and state needs in the future. Millions of lives across a diverse, vibrant, and new 
California depend on it. 
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